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HUMANS VS. ROBOTS: RETHINKING TAX POLICY FOR A
MORE SUSTAINABLE FUTURE
KATHRYN KISSKA-SCHULZE * & KARIE DAVIS-NOZEMACK **
INTRODUCTION
Bill Gates wants a robot tax. 1 His recent proposal to tax robots that
replace human workers highlights a growing concern that rapid innovation,
and automation in particular, will displace many workers and cause significant unemployment. 2 Research supports automation’s potential for widespread worker displacement. One study estimates that 47% of U.S. jobs are
at high risk of replacement by robotic or software automation. 3 Similarly,
McKinsey estimates that by 2030 one third of the human workforce in ad-

© 2020 Kathryn Kisska-Schulze and Karie Davis-Nozemack
* Professor Kathryn Kisska-Schulze is an Assistant Professor in the School of Accountancy at
Clemson University’s College of Business.
** Professor Karie Davis-Nozemack is an Associate Professor of Law and Ethics in Georgia Tech’s
Scheller College of Business. The authors wish to thank the American Business Law Journal Invited
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1. See Malcolm James, Here’s How Bill Gates’ Plan to Tax Robots Could Actually Happen,
BUS. INSIDER (Mar. 20, 2017, 11:18 AM), http://www.businessinsider.com/bill-gates-robot-taxbrighter-future-2017-3.
2. See Carl Benedikt Frey & Michael A. Osborne, The Future of Employment: How Susceptible Are Jobs to Computerisation?, 114 TECHNOLOGICAL FORECASTING & SOC. CHANGE 254, 268
(2017) (analyzing tasks and jobs at risk of automation to calculate total risk in the U.S. economy);
see also Ryan Calo, Artificial Intelligence Policy: A Primer and Roadmap, 51 U.C. DAVIS L. REV.
399, 425–27 (2017) (noting public concerns regarding AI taking over human jobs); Cynthia Estlund,
What Should We Do After Work? Automation and Employment Law, 128 YALE L.J. 254, 258 (2018)
(documenting that there are no identifiable industries or sectors that can absorb the number of workers whose jobs will be displaced due to robotics); Lewis D. Solomon, The Microelectronics Revolution, Job Displacement, and the Future of Work: A Policy Commentary, 63 CHI.-KENT L. REV.
65, 71–75 (1987) (analyzing the impact of machinery on labor).
3. See Frey & Osborne, supra note 2, at 268.
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vanced economies like the United States may be required to change occupations and learn new skills to remain employed. 4 Rapid automation is predicted to increase unemployment rates and intensify economic inequality. 5
The current fourth industrial revolution, like the previous three industrial revolutions, is transforming workplaces with machinery improvements. 6
The first industrial revolution’s steam engine is today’s artificial intelligence.
However, the speed of innovation and the effect on so many diverse industries is unprecedented. 7 Software and robotics are not only automating blue
collar jobs, but also threaten to replace the white-collar jobs historically
thought protected. 8
Displaced workers often rely on social aid to ease the transition between
jobs and to prevent poverty. The U.S. social safety net provides retirement,
disability, medical, and unemployment benefits for displaced, retired, and
disabled workers 9 through Social Security, Medicare, and unemployment insurance. 10 U.S. social safety net programs kept 36 million people out of poverty in 2017. 11 Ninety-seven percent of U.S. persons aged sixty- to eighty-

4. See JAMES MANYIKA ET AL., MCKINSEY GLOBAL INST., JOBS LOST, JOBS GAINED:
WORKFORCE TRANSITIONS IN A TIME OF AUTOMATION 1, 11 (2017), https://www.mckinsey.com/featured-insights/future-of-work/jobs-lost-jobs-gained-what-the-future-of-work-willmean-for-jobs-skills-and-wages (estimating size of workforce changes based on various scenarios).
5. See Ryan Abbott & Bret Bogenschneider, Should Robots Pay Taxes? Tax Policy in the Age
of Automation, 12 HARV. L. POL’Y REV. 145, 147 (2018) (regarding unemployment and economic
inequality); see also Ronald C. Brown, Made in China 2025: Implications of Robotization and Digitalization on MNC Labor Supply Chains and Workers’ Labor Rights in China, 9 TSINGHUA CHINA
L. REV. 186, 200 (2017) (commenting that automation could trigger a loss of social security benefits).
6. See Brown, supra note 5, at 210 (documenting that the fourth revolution appears to be
evolving “faster than its predecessors”); see also infra Part I (discussing the evolution of industrialization in the United States).
7. See Brown, supra note 5, at 210.
8. See, e.g., Matthew J. Belvedere, AI Will Obliterate Half of All Jobs, Starting with White
Collar, Says Ex-Google China President, CNBC (Nov. 13, 2017, 11:35 AM),
https://www.cnbc.com/2017/11/13/ex-google-china-president-a-i-to-obliterate-white-collar-jobsfirst.html; Pedro Nicolaci da Costa, Robots and Automation Are Going White Collar—But They’re
Not Here to Steal Your Job Just Yet, BUS. INSIDER (Apr. 1, 2017, 9:41 AM), https://www.businessinsider.com/white-collar-jobs-and-automation-2017-3; Will Knight, Is Technology About to
Decimate White-Collar Work?, MIT TECH. REV. (Nov. 6, 2017), https://www.technologyreview.com/s/609337/is-technology-about-to-decimate-white-collar-work/; Alison DeNisco
Rayome, Robots Will Steal Your White Collar Office Job, Too: 3 Case Studies, TECHREPUBLIC
(July 9, 2018, 10:16 AM), https://www.techrepublic.com/article/robots-will-steal-your-white-collar-office-job-too-3-case-studies/.
9. See infra Part II.
10. See Kenneth R. Wing, The Impact of Reagan-Era Politics on the Federal Medicaid Program, 33 CATH. U. L. REV. 1, 34 (1983) (noting inclusions to the U.S. social safety net).
11. DANILO TRISI & MATT SAENZ, CTR. ON BUDGET & POLICY PRIORITIES, ECONOMIC
SECURITY PROGRAMS CUT POVERTY NEARLY IN HALF OVER LAST 50 YEARS 4 (2019),
https://www.cbpp.org/sites/default/files/atoms/files/9-14-18pov.pdf.
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nine-years-old collect or will collect Social Security, 12 and Medicare, as the
largest health insurance program, 13 provides benefits to 44 million. 14 In addition, unemployment benefits are paid to nearly 2 million Americans annually. 15 Social safety net programs ameliorate poverty, and more than 60% of
the U.S. population favors expansion of these types of programs. 16
Payroll taxes finance Social Security, Medicare, and unemployment
programs. 17 Payroll taxes, imposed on wages earned, provide 33% of total
federal revenue. 18 As innovation advancements lead toward escalated automation substitution in the workforce, 19 displaced workers will increasingly
rely on benefits and will be incapable of contributing to the payroll tax that
funds them. 20
Increased labor substitution resulting from automation innovation
threatens to undermine the safety net programs. 21 This threat is the impetus
for Mr. Gates’ proposal to tax robots. His suggestion appears elegant on its
face, in that it proposes to fill the revenue deficit by taxing the very catalyst

12. Policy Basics: Top Ten Facts About Social Security, CTR. ON BUDGET & POL’Y
PRIORITIES, https://www.cbpp.org/sites/default/files/atoms/files/8-8-16socsec.pdf (last updated
Aug. 14, 2019).
13. See Bruce D. Meyer & Derek Wu, The Poverty Reduction of Social Security and MeansTested Transfers 7 (Nat’l Bureau of Econ. Research, Working Paper No. 24567, 2018),
https://www.nber.org/papers/w24567.
14. BEN UMANS & K. LYNN NONNEMAKER, AARP PUB. POLICY INST., THE MEDICARE
BENEFICIARY POPULATION 1 (2009), https://assets.aarp.org/rgcenter/health/fs149_medicare.pdf
(providing overview of Medicare program which provides care for 58 million people in the United
States).
15. See Paul Wiseman, U.S. Unemployment Claims Fall to 220,000, Lowest in 44 Years, USA
TODAY (Oct. 19, 2017, 10:19 AM), https://www.usatoday.com/story/money/economy/2017/10/19/u-s-unemployment-claims-fall-222-000-lowest-44-years/779522001/ (reporting
on Labor Department statistics as well as causes and effects of change in statistics).
16. PUB. POLICY POLLING, NATIONAL SURVEY RESULTS (2018), https://www.socialsecurityworks.org/wp-content/uploads/2018/03/Nat-Social-Security-March-18-2-Results.pdf (pertaining
to Social Security and Medicare).
17. See Policy Basics: Federal Payroll Taxes, CTR. ON BUDGET & POL’Y PRIORITIES,
https://www.cbpp.org/research/federal-tax/policy-basics-federal-payroll-taxes (last updated Jun.
24, 2019) (noting that payroll taxes fund “Social Security, Medicare, and other social insurance
benefits”); see also Bobby L. Dexter, Tenure Buyouts: Employment Death Taxes and the Curious
Obesity of “Wages,” 70 U. PITT. L. REV. 343, 351 (2009) (documenting the United States uses
payroll taxes to pay those entitled to collect Social Security benefits).
18. See Matthew T. Bodie, Employment as Fiduciary Relationship, 105 GEO. L.J. 819, 846
(2017) (noting the 33% revenue source); see also Sachin S. Pandya, Tax Liability for Wage Theft,
3 COLUM. J. TAX L. 113, 126 (2012) (documenting that the payroll tax is imposed on both employers
and employees).
19. See infra Section I.B.
20. See Dexter, supra note 17, at 351–52 (identifying that a similar concern was raised several
decades ago when Social Security administrators realized that “the level of contributing workers
would be unable to meet the demand” of baby boomers entering retirement and requesting benefits).
21. See infra Part III.
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for the lost revenue. Although robotic taxation presents interesting inquiries, 22 we suggest that the robot tax proposal masks the underlying tension
between innovation tax and employment tax policies, and this long-standing
tension cannot be resolved with superficial suggestions. The growing strain
of automation substitution on the U.S. workforce shows that the social safety
net is fraying because employment tax and innovation policies are disharmonized.
This Article will analyze the intersection of U.S. industrialization with
employment and innovation tax policies. It will investigate how seemingly
disconnected tax policies collectively imperil the U.S. social safety net system and chart a course towards harmonizing them. Part I will show how
industrialization and innovation have historically shaped the U.S. workforce
and will use this foundation to predict how automation substitution will impact the workforce in the near term. It will use economic research to validate
concerns about automation substitution and its negative impact on employment. Part II will analyze the social benefit goals underpinning U.S. employment tax policy and will identify the detrimental effects of automation substitution on social safety net funding. Part III will examine how innovation
policy has supported the third and fourth industrial revolutions but, in so doing, has strayed from the original twin goals of economic development and
social benefit. This Part will also show how economic progress has eclipsed
the importance of social benefits in this policy. Finally, Part IV will determine that existing tax literature has not required employment tax and innovation policies to remain faithful to their original social goals. Consequently,
this Article will make the case for a new approach to tax policy analysis, one
that asks fundamental, normative questions. It will explain how sustainability provides an approach for balancing economic and social goals and addressing intergenerational equity. It also will show that sustainability will
not supplant other approaches to tax policy but is sufficiently interdisciplinary and robust to incorporate their lessons.
I. INDUSTRIALIZATION AND INNOVATION
Industrialization denotes more than the historical evolution from manual
labor to machinery to robotic technology. 23 As scholar Ruth Cowan notes,

22. See Abbott & Bogenschneider, supra note 5, at 149–50 (suggesting that existing tax policies must change in anticipation of substantial job loss due to automation substitution); Sami Ahmed, Cryptocurrency & Robots: How to Tax and Pay Tax on Them, 69 S.C. L. REV. 697, 731–32
(2018) (discussing advantages and disadvantages of implementing a robot tax); Orly Mazur, Taxing
the Robots, 46 PEPP. L. REV. 277, 280–82 (2019) (proposing tax and non-tax policy measures to
improve the future labor market with a focus on balancing capital and labor income).
23. See RUTH SCHWARTZ COWAN, A SOCIAL HISTORY OF AMERICAN TECHNOLOGY 67
(1997).
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“Every nook and cranny of social and economic life was implicated in the
[industrial] process and affected by it . . . young and old, men and women,
rich and poor, immigrant and native born.” 24 Technology has been an essential cultural component, slowly transforming man-made craftsmanship into a
digital production. 25 Although industrialization transformed labor markets
throughout history, the fourth industrial revolution is poised to alter the future
labor pool by replacing human workers in unparalleled fashion. 26 The fourth
revolution’s automation substitution is more than robots replacing human
workers on manufacturing production lines. 27 It encompasses smart robots
capable of learning and will impact not only manufacturing, but also finance,
accounting, management, and healthcare previously assumed free from automation risk. 28
This Part provides context for the current fourth industrial revolution’s
sweeping changes as well as for the legal regimes in which industrialization
operates. To that end, Section I.A offers a historical backdrop for the first,
second, and third industrial revolutions. Building upon this historical context, Section I.B identifies the hallmarks of the fourth industrial revolution
and explores its relationship to automation substitution and worker displacement.
A. The Impact of the First, Second, and Third Industrial Revolutions
There have been three prior industrial revolutions, with a fourth revolution developing. 29 The first revolution transformed farming, cotton, and
metal working industries with mechanization during the late eighteenth and
early nineteenth centuries, but occurred primarily in Britain. 30 The second

24. Id.
25. See id. at 1, 65.
26. See, e.g., Abbott & Bogenschneider, supra note 5, at 159 (noting that improvements in
computers are resulting in their ability to replace low-skilled workers); Brown, supra note 5, at 189–
90 (discussing the possibility that robots will replace human workers); Chris Fleissner, Note, Inclusive Capitalism Based on Binary Economics and Positive International Human Rights In the Age of
Artificial Intelligence, 17 WASH. U. GLOBAL STUD. L. REV. 201, 212 (2018) (offering that the replacement of human workers by artificial intelligence would suppress wages and economic growth).
27. See Michael Chui, James Manyika & Mehdi Miremadi, Where Machines Could Replace
Humans—and Where They Can’t (Yet), MCKINSEY Q. (July 8, 2016), https://www.mckinsey.com/business-functions/digital-mckinsey/our-insights/where-machines-could-replace-humansand-where-they-cant-yet (using data to predict automation substitution trends by work activity).
28. See id. (noting industries affected by automation substitution).
29. See Solomon, supra note 2, at 65 (discussing the first three Industrial Revolutions); see
also Peter Miscovich, The Future Is Automated. Here’s How We Can Prepare for It, WORLD ECON.
FORUM (Jan. 12, 2017), https://www.weforum.org/agenda/2017/01/the-future-is-automated-here-show-we-can-prepare-for-it/ (noting the emergence of the Fourth Revolution in the workforce).
30. See Industrial Revolution, ENCYCLOPEDIA BRITANNICA (Sept. 4, 2019), https://www.britannica.com/event/Industrial-Revolution.
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revolution, from the late nineteenth century until World War I, brought assembly lines, mass production, and large firms to the United States. 31 Microelectronics and computerized technology of the 1980s launched the third
industrial revolution. 32 The fourth revolution is now transforming society
with digitization, robotization, and cyber systems. 33 Each industrial revolution dramatically altered the workplace. 34
1. Production: Second Industrial Revolution
Throughout the colonial period and briefly thereafter, most Americans
were farmers. 35 Hand labor remained prevalent through the end of the American Civil War, constraining domestic industrial production capabilities. 36
After the Civil War, mechanization emerged in the United States, increasing
speed and output. 37 In 1850 there were 116 carpet mills with 6000 workers
in the United States; just twenty years later, the industry had doubled in
size. 38 As machines replaced hand labor and firms adopted Henry Ford’s
1913 assembly line, 39 production capacity exploded. 40
The second industrial revolution saw a marked labor shift from farm to
factory, and employment increased from “2.5 to 10 million workers from
1880 to 1920.” 41 Until the late 1800s, the term “unemployment” did not exist
in the United States. 42 Low population and labor scarcity required laborers
31. See Solomon, supra note 2, at 65 (tracing the industrial revolutions).
32. See id. (discussing the third industrial revolution).
33. See Brown, supra note 5, at 188–89.
34. See id. at 188 (noting that digitalization is having a widespread and evolving impact on
production, workers, and labor and employment laws).
35. Susan Pace Hamill, From Special Privilege to General Utility: A Continuation of Willard
Hurst’s Study of Corporations, 49 AM. U. L. REV. 81, 92 (1999).
36. See History of the United States Industrialization and Reform (1870–1916),
THEUSAONLINE.COM, http://www.theusaonline.com/history/industrialization.htm (last visited Jan.
11, 2019).
37. See Ed Crews, Weaving, Spinning, and Dyeing, TREND & TRADITION, Winter 2007, at 84–
87.
38. See Randall L. Patton, A History of the U.S. Carpet Industry, EH.NET, https://eh.net/encyclopedia/a-history-of-the-u-s-carpet-industry/ (last visited Jan. 11, 2019).
39. See Sally H. Clarke, Unmanageable Risks: MacPherson v. Buick and the Emergence of a
Mass Consumer Market, 23 L. & HIST. REV. 1, 11 (2005); see also Kat Eschner, One Hundred and
Three Years Ago Today, Henry Ford Introduced the Assembly Line: His Workers Hated It,
SMITHSONIAN MAG.:SMARTNEWS (Dec. 1, 2016), https://www.smithsonianmag.com/smartnews/one-hundred-and-three-years-ago-today-henry-ford-introduced-assembly-line-his-workershated-it-180961267/ (discussing early employment numbers at Ford).
40. See History of the United States Industrialization and Reform, supra note 36.
41. See Charles Hirschman & Elizabeth Mogford, Immigration and the American Industrial
Revolution from 1880 to 1920, 38 SOC. SCI. RES. 897 (2009).
42. Cynthia Crossen, Until the Late 1800’s, U.S. Had Never Known Unemployment Woes,
STREET
J.
(Dec.
3,
2003,
12:01
AM),
https://www.wsj.com/artiWALL
cles/SB107040655254249400.
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to exploit land and resources on their own; 43 however, industrialization led
to urbanization. Between 1870 and 1920, 11 million people relocated to cities, and most of the 25 million European immigrants also settled in American
cities. 44
The birth of industry and corporations resulted in clear demarcation
lines between rich and poor, engendering discontent among the population. 45
For the first time in American history, workers experienced job insecurity. 46
Although manufacturing jobs were abundant, wages were low and job security uncertain. 47 In response to social and economic influences of the times,
trade unions took shape. 48
The stock market crash of Black Tuesday catapulted the United States
into the Great Depression, coinciding with the end of the second industrial
revolution. 49 Before 1929, unemployment was approximately 3.3%; by 1930
that rate increased to 8.9%, and just one year later jumped to 15.9%. 50 By
1933, the unemployment rate hit its pinnacle of 24.9%. 51 To address economic turmoil and mass unemployment, federal social insurance was implemented to help restore national economic stability. 52
2. Technology Boom: Third Industrial Revolution
Although the shift from farming to urbanization brought about new divisions of labor that embraced innovation, advancements during the first and

43. See Stanley L. Engerman & Kenneth L. Sokoloff, Once Upon a Time in the Americas:
Land and Immigration Policies in the New World, in UNDERSTANDING LONG-RUN ECONOMIC
GROWTH: GEOGRAPHY, INSTITUTIONS, AND THE KNOWLEDGE ECONOMY 13, 14 (Dora L. Costa &
Naomi R. Lamoreaux eds., 2011).
44. See America Moves to the City, KHAN ACADEMY, https://www.khanacademy.org/humanities/ap-us-history/period-6/apush-gilded-age/a/america-moves-to-the-city (last visited Jan. 11,
2019).
45. See History of the United States Industrialization and Reform, supra note 36.
46. See Gary Minda, Aging Workers in the Postindustrial Era, 26 STETSON L. REV. 561, 594
(1996) (noting “great anxiety and job insecurity” of the American workforce as a result of industrial
revolution).
47. See id.
48. See G. William Domhoff, The Rise and Fall of Labor Unions in the U.S., WHO RULES
AMERICA?, https://whorulesamerica.ucsc.edu/power/history_of_labor_unions.html (last visited
Jan. 11, 2019) (providing a history of labor unions in the United States from the 1830s to 1980s).
49. See Joy Sabino Mullane, Perfect Storms: Congressional Regulation of Executive Compensation, 57 VILL. L. REV. 589, 594 (2012) (noting the impact of the stock market crash on the Great
Depression); see also Bradford L. Smith, The Third Industrial Revolution: Policymaking for the
Internet, 3 COLUM. SCI. & TECH. L. REV. 1, 2 (2001) (noting the Second Industrial Revolution ended
in about 1930).
50. Mullane, supra note 49.
51. Id.
52. See infra Part III for further discussion.
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second revolutions were gradual. 53 The introduction of the computer, however, dramatically changed the speed at which innovation evolved, repeatedly
doubling computing and technological capabilities over short terms. 54
Computers and the internet propelled twentieth-century society into the
third industrial revolution. 55 Emerging technologies during this period included smartphones, Global Positioning System (“GPS”), and mobile broadband. 56 Computers transformed brick and mortar offices into virtual workplaces. 57 Rapid improvements in information technology and mobile devices
influenced businesses and consumers to become more productive. 58
Evolving technology also changed communication. 59 Cell phones provided “email and web browsing capabilities.” 60 Smart phones replaced the
need for landlines, answering machines, scanners, point and click cameras,
and digital music players. 61 Social technologies like blogs, wikis, and social
networks transformed communication culturally and organizationally. 62 Today more than one third of the global population uses some form of social

53. See BYRON REESE, THE FOURTH
THE FUTURE OF HUMANITY 21, 25 (2018).

AGE: SMART ROBOTS, CONSCIOUS COMPUTERS, AND

54. See id. at 27–28.
55. See Goncalo de Vasconcelos, The Third Industrial Revolution–Internet, Energy and a New
Financial System, FORBES (Mar. 4, 2015, 8:50 AM), https://www.forbes.com/sites/goncalodevasconcelos/2015/03/04/the-third-industrial-revolution-internet-energy-and-a-new-financial-system/#5aa121b3271a (documenting that the third industrial revolution emerged in the mid1990s).
56. See Annalisa Quinn, Move over Millennials, Here Comes ‘iGen’ . . . or Maybe Not, NPR
(Sept. 17, 2017, 7:01 AM), https://www.npr.org/2017/09/17/548664627/move-over-millennialshere-comes-igen-or-maybe-not (discussing the impact of Generation Z); see also Will McLennan,
Great Life-Improving Inventions of the 2000s, THERICHEST (Nov. 23, 2013), https://www.therichest.com/business/technology/the-top-10-life-improving-inventions-of-the-2000s/
(documenting
some of the greatest technological inventions of the 2000s).
57. See Nancy J. King, Labor Law for Managers of Non-Union Employees in Traditional and
Cyber Workplaces, 40 AM. BUS. L.J. 827, 830 (2003) (further discussing cyber and virtual workspaces).
58. See Clayton Browne, How Have Computers Changed the Workplace?, CAREER TREND
(July 5, 2017), https://careertrend.com/computers-changed-workplace-2197.html.
59. See Ric Simmons, Why 2007 Is Not Like 1984: A Broader Perspective on Technology’s
Effect on Privacy and Fourth Amendment Jurisprudence, 97 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 531, 568
(2007) (noting that “technology has changed the way we communicate and store information”).
60. Robert A. Pikowsky, The Need for Revisions to the Law of Wiretapping and Interception
of Email, 10 MICH. TELECOMM. TECH. L. REV. 1, 2–3 (2003).
61. Tim Stenovec, 13 Things the Smartphone Has Made Obsolete, BUS. INSIDER (Nov. 21,
2015, 9:56 AM), http://www.businessinsider.com/13-things-the-smartphone-has-made-obsolete2015-11.
62. See Martin Harrysson, The Evolution of Social Technologies, MCKINSEY Q. (June 29,
2016), https://www.mckinsey.com/industries/high-tech/our-insights/the-evolution-of-social-technologies (discussing the incorporation of social network culture in business models).
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media platform—Facebook, Snapchat, Twitter, or Instagram—to share information. 63 The Internet also introduced retail electronic commerce (“e-commerce”) 64 and eased barriers to global business. 65 Thanks in large part to
Amazon.com, e-commerce is expected to comprise 17% of U.S. retail sales
by 2022. 66
Although the speed at which technological advancements occurred during the third industrial revolution was previously unmatched, society is now
on the brink of even more explosive innovations with automation and robotics. 67 The momentum of today’s fourth industrial revolution sets the stage
for profound transformations in the way society works and lives. 68 As technology author Byron Reese documented in his recent book, The Fourth Age:
Smart Robots, Conscious Computers, and the Future of Humanity, “while it
took us almost five thousand years to get from the abacus to the iPad, twentyfive years from now, we will have something as far ahead of the iPad as it is
ahead of the abacus.” 69
B. The Impact of Automation Innovation and Robotics in the Fourth
Industrial Revolution
Technologists foresee the fourth industrial revolution as the time period
for which artificial intelligence and robots facilitate change fundamentally
different in type, speed, and reach from the incremental machinery improvements of the previous revolutions. 70 Genetic engineering, artificial intelligence, robotics, and three-dimensional (“3D”) printing are opportunities for
63. Audrey Willis, 6 Ways Social Media Changed the Way We Communicate, HIGHER EDUC.
MARKETING J. (Aug. 15, 2017), http://circaedu.com/hemj/how-social-media-changed-the-way-wecommunicate/.
64. See Tapio Puurunen, The Judicial Jurisdiction of States over International Business-toConsumer Electronic Commerce from the Perspective of Legal Certainty, 8 U.C. DAVIS J. INT’L L.
& POL’Y 133, 136 (2002) (discussing the rise of electronic commercial retail).
65. See Kathryn Kisska-Schulze, The Future of E-Mail Taxation in the Wake of the Expiration
of the Internet Tax Freedom Act, 51 AM. BUS. L.J. 315, 321 (2014) (discussing how the rise of
electronic commercial retail has enabled customers to remotely pass national borders).
66. Daniel Keyes, E-Commerce Will Make Up 17% of All U.S. Retail Sales by 2022—and One
Company is the Main Reason, BUS. INSIDER (Aug. 11, 2017, 11:12 AM), http://www.businessinsider.com/e-commerce-retail-sales-2022-amazon-2017-8; see also Note, Online Retailers
Battle with Sales Tax: A Physical Rule Living in a Digital World, 46 SUFFOLK U. L. REV. 673, 678
(2013) (noting the date of Amazon’s incorporation).
67. See Brown, supra note 5, at 209–10 (documenting that the fourth revolution appears to be
evolving faster than its predecessors).
68. See id. at 187 (noting that the technology of the fourth industrial revolution will radically
change industry, production value chains, and business models).
69. REESE, supra note 53, at 30.
70. See UNITED NATIONS ECON. & SOC. COMM’N FOR W. ASIA (UNESCWA), FOURTH
INDUSTRIAL REVOLUTION: IMPACT OF THE FOURTH INDUSTRIAL REVOLUTION ON DEVELOPMENT
IN THE ARAB REGION 3–4 (2019), https://www.unescwa.org/sites/www.unescwa.org/files/publications/files/impact-fourth-industrial-revolution-development-arab-region-english.pdf
(discussing
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humans to even more closely collaborate with machinery. 71 The human-machine alliance is becoming ubiquitous globally and a daily experience for
many. The technologies of the fourth industrial revolution have a “systems
level impact” on nearly all aspects of human lives; this impact is in contrast
to the breadth of previous revolutions. 72 For example, one in six Americans
owns a voice-activated smart speaker. 73 Domino’s successfully delivered its
first pizza via drone, and Amazon added 55,000 robots in 2017 to automate
internal operations. 74 While the fourth industrial revolution is indeed radical
in many ways, the focus of this Article is automation substitution for workers.
Recent studies suggest that automation innovation may be a catalyst for
job displacement in the future. A recent study estimates that 47% of U.S.
jobs are at high risk for automation replacement. 75 While jobs in lower-risk
categories include management, business, education, and media performance
positions, 76 occupations exhibiting a high probability of automation substitution include sales, services, construction, transportation, office administration and material moving positions. 77 In assessing automation risk, the study

the speed, breadth, impact and disruption of the fourth industrial revolution and contrasting it with
previous industrial revolutions) [hereinafter UNESCWA]; see also James Pethokoukis, We Aren’t
Doomed: My Review of “The Fourth Age: Smart Robots, Conscious Computers, and the Future of
Humanity” by Byron Reese, AEI (Oct. 19, 2018), https://www.aei.org/economics/we-arentdoomed-my-review-of-the-fourth-age-smart-robots-conscious-computers-and-the-future-of-humanity-by-byron-reese/ (discussing the fourth industrial revolution in the context of Reese’s book).
71. See Klaus Schwab & Richard Samans, Preface to WORLD ECON. FORUM, THE FUTURE OF
JOBS: EMPLOYMENT, SKILLS AND WORKFORCE STRATEGY FOR THE FOURTH INDUSTRIAL
REVOLUTION v (2016), http://www3.weforum.org/docs/WEF_Future_of_Jobs.pdf (specifying the
various types of technology propelling us into the fourth industrial revolution); see also Insights
Contributor, How The World’s Top Executives Are Approaching The Fourth Industrial Revolution,
FORBES INSIGHTS (Jan. 22, 2018, 9:00 AM), https://www.forbes.com/sites/insightsdeloitte/2018/01/22/how-the-worlds-top-executives-are-approaching-the-fourth-industrial-revolution/#5ba399547abd (noting that the fourth industrial revolution will allow for collaboration between human and machine).
72. See UNESCWA, supra note 70, at 4–5.
73. Following Holiday Surge, One in Six Americans Owns a Voice-Activated Smart Speaker,
NPR (Jan. 10, 2018), https://www.npr.org/about-npr/577007267/jan-2018-smart-audio-report.
74. See Erin Winick, Amazon’s Investment in Robots Is Eliminating Human Jobs, MIT TECH.
REV. (Dec. 4, 2017), https://www.technologyreview.com/the-download/609672/amazons-investment-in-robots-is-eliminating-human-jobs/ (discussing Amazon’s investment in robotics); see also
Andrew Meola, Shop Online and Get Your Items Delivery by a Drone Delivery Service: The Future
Amazon and Domino’s Have Envisioned for Us, BUS. INSIDER (July 18, 2017, 12:30 PM),
http://www.businessinsider.com/delivery-drones-market-service-2017-7 (analyzing drone delivery
in the retail industry).
75. See Frey & Osborne, supra note 2, at 268.
76. See id. at 266–67 (further noting that while media occupations are vastly different from
those of chief executives, they require a wide range of tasks involving social intelligence and thus
unlikely to be subject to computerization).
77. See id. at 266–68.
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found a correlation between high-risk positions and worker wages, forecasting that automation will be a main substitute for low-skilled and low-wage
jobs in the future. 78
A 2017 McKinsey Global Institute study estimated that 400 to 800 million persons globally may be displaced by automation by 2030. 79 Of that
total, 75 to 375 million individuals may have to change occupations or learn
new skills to remain employable. 80 For advanced economies like the United
States and Germany, one third of the workforce may be affected by 2030.81
Automation substitution also threatens white collar jobs. 82 Tasks previously
conducted by highly-skilled persons but can now be augmented by automation 83 include accounting, law, and medicine. 84
In 2017, the Pew Research Center found that 72% of Americans worry
that “robots and computers are capable of doing many jobs that are currently
done by humans.” 85 Seventy-five percent felt that the U.S. economy will not
create enough new and better-paying human jobs if robots and computers
displace human workers in the future. 86 Although only 30% of participants
found it somewhat likely that their own jobs would be replaced by robots or
computers during their lifetime, participants viewed certain professions as
being at greater risk, including fast food workers, insurance claims processors, software engineers, and legal clerks. 87
While these studies prompt important questions about the impact of automation substitution on the workforce, this paper does not support that every
robot introduced into the labor market will displace a human worker. Robots
produce two different economic effects: a displacement effect and a productivity effect. 88 Automation innovation displaces workers, but it also creates

78. See id. at 269.
79. See Manyika et al., supra note 4, at 11.
80. See id.
81. See id. In China, for example, the percent of the workforce forecast to require an occupational change is upwards of 13%, while in India that percentage drops to 6%. Id.
82. See Belvedere, supra note 8.
83. See id.
84. See Nicolaci da Costa, supra note 8.
85. Aaron Smith & Monica Anderson, Automation in Everyday Life, PEW RES. CTR. (Oct. 4,
2017), http://www.pewinternet.org/2017/10/04/automation-in-everyday-life/.
86. See id.
87. See id. The report notes that 77% of respondents indicated that fast food workers are at
greater risk of automation, 65% highlighted insurance claims processors to be at risk; 53% viewed
software engineers as being at greater risk, and 50% noted legal clerks as being at risk for substitution. Other highlighted professions include: construction workers (42%), teachers (36%), and
nurses (20%). Id.
88. See Daron Acemoglu & Pascual Restrepo, Robots and Jobs: Evidence from U.S. Labor
Markets 2–3 (Nat’l Bureau of Econ. Research, Working Paper No. 23285, 2017),
http://www.nber.org/papers/w23285.
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a productivity effect that drives up labor and wages in other areas of the economy. 89 Just as robot usage in one industry has labor and wage effects in other
industries, it also ripples through related economies. 90 As economics scholars note,
[E]ven if the presumed technological advances materialize, there
is no guarantee that firms would choose to automate; that would
depend on the costs of substituting machines for labor and how
much wages change in response to this threat. Second, the labor
market impacts of new technologies depend not only on where they
hit but also on the adjustment in other parts of the economy. For
example, other sectors and occupations might expand to soak up
the labor freed from the tasks that are now performed by machines,
and productivity improvements due to new machines may even expand employment in affected industries. 91
Even accounting for the productivity effect, scholars predict increased robot
usage will have a negative impact on employment and wages 92 and that automation substitution significantly targets low-skilled workers. 93
Society is only at the dawn of the fourth industrial revolution, and the
effect of automation substitution on the workforce is foreboding. Each of the
prior revolutions increased worker productivity. This fourth industrial revolution, however, is setting up to be vastly different from its predecessors in
both speed and breadth of labor substitution, prompting concerns about future
job displacement and the negative impact of automation substitution on
wages. Workforce unease, and the resulting social impact that may ensue,
has led prominent figures like Bill Gates to propose a tax on robots that take
over human jobs. 94

89. See id.
90. See id. at 4 (“[I]n practice, the more intensive use of robots in a commuting zone reduces
the costs of the products now produced using robots in the entire US economy, and thus trigger
some expansion of employment and wages in other commuting zones. Our model, by incorporating
trade between commuting zones, enables us to quantify this effect.”)
91. Id. at 1–2.
92. See id. at 36 (“[I]f the spread of robots proceeds as expected by experts over the next two
decades . . . the future aggregate implications of the spread of robots could be much more sizable.”
(citing ERIK BRYNJOLFSSON & ANDREW MCAFEE, THE SECOND MACHINE AGE: WORK,
PROGRESS, AND PROSPERITY IN A TIME OF BRILLIANT TECHNOLOGIES (2014))).
93. See Georg Graetz & Guy Michaels, Robots at Work, 100 REV. ECON. & STAT. 753, 766
(2018); see also Acemoglu & Restrepo, supra note 88, at 6 (“Most closely related to our work is
the pioneering paper by Graetz and Michaels (2015). Focusing on the variation in robot usage
across industries in different countries, they estimate that industrial robots increase productivity and
wages, but reduce the employment of low-skill workers.”).
94. See James, supra note 1.
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The United States has historically encouraged innovation because of the
social and economic spillover effects. 95 However, as society evolved towards greater human-machine alliances, innovation tax policy began to promote the economic gains of innovation at the expense of social benefits. 96
While the fundamental premise behind U.S. employment tax policy is the
promotion of social general welfare, worker displacement due to automation
substitution could result in our country’s inability to meet benefit demands. 97
The intersection of technology and existing legal regimes threatens to undermine rather than improve the human condition. The next two Parts examine
the foundations of the legal regimes at issue, employment tax and innovation
tax policies, to expose how these policies function together during the fourth
industrial revolution.
II. EMPLOYMENT TAX POLICY AND INDUSTRIALIZATION
The federal employment tax (“payroll tax”) is the major revenue source
for social insurance contributions in the United States, including Social Security, Medicare, and unemployment. 98 The payroll tax is imposed on wages
earned by employees via the Federal Insurance Contributions Act (“FICA”) 99
and Medicare and on the self-employed via the Self-Employed Contributions
Act (“SECA”). 100 The tax promotes social responsibility by shielding retirees, disabled, and survivors of deceased workers against poverty and financial dependency. 101 In addition, the federal unemployment tax (“FUTA”) 102
is assessed on employers and provides financial benefits to involuntarily unemployed workers. 103

95. See infra text accompanying notes 157–198.
96. See infra Part III.C.
97. See Abbott & Bogenschneider, supra note 5, at 170; see also Dexter, supra note 17, at
351–52 (noting that a parallel concern was raised when Social Security administrators realized that
the level of contributing workers was unable to meet the demands of baby boomers entering retirement and requesting benefits several decades ago; this issue has raised the concern that baby boomers will bankrupt Social Security).
98. See MAUREEN ANNE GRIFFIN, CONG. BUDGET OFFICE, PAYROLL TAX, FEDERAL 320
(1999),
https://www.urban.org/sites/default/files/publication/69526/1000540-Payroll-Tax-Federal.PDF.
99. I.R.C. §§ 3101–28 (2012).
100. Id. §§ 1401–03.
101. See Joel F. Handler, The “Third Way” or the Old Way?, 48 KAN. L. REV. 765, 768 (2000)
(noting that France and Sweden are more effective at “reducing poverty and minimizing dependency
among lone-parent families than the United States”).
102. I.R.C. §§ 3301–11.
103. See Griffin, supra note 98, at 321.
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Since passage of the Social Security Act in 1935, 104 the United States
has depended on employment tax revenue generated by the working class to
fund social security payments to retirees. 105 Displacement of wage earners
due to automation substitution could result in the inability to meet benefit
demands. 106
A. Origin and Purpose of the Federal Employment Tax
Congress adopted the beginnings of what would later be known as the
Old Age, Survivors, and Disability Insurance program (“OASDI”) in 1935,
as part of the Social Security Act, 107 and substantially amended it in 1939 108
before it had been fully implemented. 109 President Franklin D. Roosevelt
promoted social insurance to restore U.S. economic stability during the Great
Depression. 110 The legislation included provisions for old-age and unemployment benefits. 111 The Act was later amended to include child dependent,
survivor, and disability benefits, 112 and, in 1965, health insurance (Medicare)
was incorporated into the program. 113
104. Social Security Act, ch. 531, 49 Stat. 620 (1935) (codified as amended in scattered sections
of 42 U.S.C.).
105. See Policy Basics: Where Do Federal Tax Revenues Come From?, CTR. ON BUDGET &
POL’Y PRIORITIES, https://www.cbpp.org/sites/default/files/atoms/files/PolicyBasics_WhereDoFederalTaxRevsComeFrom_08-20-12.pdf (last updated June 20, 2019) (documenting that 35% of
all federal revenue is generated from payroll taxes to fund Social Security, Medicare and unemployment insurance).
106. See Abbott & Bogenschneider, supra note 5, at 170; see also Dexter, supra note 17, at
351–52 (noting that a parallel concern was raised when Social Security administrators realized that
the level of contributing workers was unable to meet the demands of baby boomers entering retirement and requesting benefits several decades ago, which some feared could bankrupt social security).
107. Social Security Act, ch. 531, 49 Stat. 620.
108. Social Security Act Amendments of 1939, ch. 666, § 205(a), 53 Stat. 1360, 1368.
109. See Larry DeWitt, The Development of Social Security in America, 70 SOC. SECURITY
BULL., Aug. 2010, at 1, 1–2, https://www.ssa.gov/policy/docs/ssb/v70n3/v70n3p1.pdf (defining the
purpose of social insurance); see also John R. Kearney, Social Security and the “D” in OASDI: The
History of a Federal Program Insuring Earners Against Disability, 66 SOC. SECURITY BULL., Aug.
2006, at 1, 3, https://www.ssa.gov/policy/docs/ssb/v66n3/v66n3p1.pdf; Susan L. Waysdorf,
Fighting for Their Lives: Women, Poverty, and the Historical Role of United States Law in Shaping
Access to Women’s Health Care, 84 KY. L.J. 745, 805 (1995–96) (documenting a history of the
Social Security Act).
110. See Kearney, supra note 109, at 2.
111. Id. at 3.
112. The Social Security Act has been amended in substantial ways many times, including in
1939, 1950, 1952, 1954, 1956, 1958, 1960, 1961, 1965, 1966, 1967, 1969, 1971. 1972, 1973, 1977,
1980, 1981, 1983, 1984, 1985, 1986, 1987, 1989, 1990, 1993, 1994, 1996, 1999, 2000, and 2004.
The major changes to dependent benefits were in 1939, with the Social Security Act Amendments
of 1939, ch. 666, § 205(a), 53 Stat. 1360, 1368. The major changes to disability benefits were in
1954, with the Social Security Act Amendments of 1954, Pub. L. 83-761, 68 Stat. 1052.
113. Social Security Amendments of 1965, Pub. L. No. 89-97, § 121(a), 79 Stat. 286, 343 (1965)
(codified as amended as 42 U.S.C. § 1396 (2012)).
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The Social Security Act was designed to ease deprivation and hardship
during the depression and its aftermath, 114 as identified in its objectives:
(1) Unemployment insurance is intended to offer workers income
maintenance during periods of unemployment due to lack of work,
providing partial wage replacement as a matter of right; (2) it is to
help maintain purchasing power and to stabilize the economy; and
(3) it is to help prevent dispersal of the employer’s trained labor
force, the sacrifice of skills, and the breakdown of labor standards
during temporary unemployment. 115
Although the Act’s purpose was to provide welfare assistance, the federal
government sought long-term solutions to prevent poverty and economic security for an increasingly aging population. 116 The second industrial revolution resulted in unfamiliar and unwelcome recessions, layoffs, and corporate
closures. 117 Government funding to protect employees and dependents
against lost wages, disability, and death while supporting an increasingly maturing population was the impetus behind the imposition of the payroll tax. 118
The payroll tax includes the FICA tax paid by employers and employees, and
the FUTA tax paid by employers only. 119
1. The Federal Insurance Contributions Act (“FICA”)
In 1937, the payroll tax was established as a contribution plan split between employees and employers on most wages paid to employees. 120 Today, the FICA tax sustains two major programs: OASDI and Medicare. 121 At
114. See Nancy J. Altman, The Striking Superiority of Social Security in the Provision of Wage
Insurance, 50 HARV. J. ON LEGIS. 109, 113 (2013).
115. Daniel N. Price, Unemployment Insurance, Then and Now, 1935–85, 48 SOC. SECURITY
BULL., Oct. 1985, at 22, 24, https://www.ssa.gov/policy/docs/ssb/v48n10/v48n10p22.pdf.
116. See Altman, supra note 114, at 113 (documenting poverty prevention); see also DeWitt,
supra note 109, at 1–2 (noting economic security).
117. See Historical Background and Development of Social Security, SOC. SECURITY ADMIN,
https://www.ssa.gov/history/briefhistory3.html (last visited Jan. 11, 2019).
118. See Altman, supra note 114, at 113–14 (discussing the legislative history and purpose of
the Social Security Act of 1935 and its progeny).
119. Understanding Employment Taxes, INTERNAL REVENUE SERV., https://www.irs.gov/businesses/small-businesses-self-employed/understanding-employment-taxes (last updated Jan. 16,
2020).
120. See Benjamin A. Templin, Social Security Reform: The Politics of the Payroll Tax, 32
QUINNIPIAC L. REV. 1, 11 (2013) (documenting that “the payroll tax was implemented in 1937”);
see also I.R.C. §§ 3101–28 (2012) (covering the FICA); Patricia E. Dilley, Through the Doughnut
Hole: Reimagining the Social Security Contribution and Benefit Base Limit, 62 ADMIN. L. REV.
367, 383 (2010) (noting that the payroll contribution plan was imposed on both employees and
employers).
121. See Richard Winchester, Working for Free: It Ought to Be Against the (Tax) Law, 76 MISS.
L.J. 227, 245–46 (2006). However, prior to the enactment of Medicare, the tax only subsidized
OASDI. See Templin, supra note 120, at 11; see also Steve Anderson, A Brief History of Medicare
in America, MEDICARERESOURCES.ORG (Sept. 1, 2019), https://www.medicareresources.org/basic-
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its inception, a 2% Social Security tax was imposed on and shared between
employers and employees on the first $3000 of taxable wages, making up
less than 2% of the total U.S. Gross Domestic Product (“GDP”) at that
time. 122 Both the rate and taxable minimum have progressively risen to a
current shared rate of 12.4% up to a $137,700 wage cap, contributing to
nearly 6% of the total U.S. GDP. 123 Most wages earned by employees up to
the scheduled ceiling are subject to the FICA tax. 124
Social Security OASDI benefits are now the chief income source for the
majority of U.S. senior citizens and provide benefits to retired persons, survivors of deceased workers, and the disabled. 125 Absent these benefits, an
additional 8% (for a total of 24%) of the U.S. population would live below
the poverty line. 126
In addition to funding Social Security, FICA also funds Medicare ben127
Established by Congress in 1965, Medicare is funded by a 2.9%
efits.

medicare-information/brief-history-of-medicare/ (documenting that Medicare health coverage was
not signed into law until after 1965).
122. See Templin, supra note 120, at 11; see also Payroll Tax Rates: 1937 to 2019, TAX POL’Y
CTR. (July 15, 2019) https://www.taxpolicycenter.org/statistics/payroll-tax-rates (noting that the
2% rate was not increased until 1950); What Are the Major Federal Payroll Taxes, and How Much
Money Do They Raise?, TAX POL’Y CTR., http://www.taxpolicycenter.org/briefing-book/what-aremajor-federal-payroll-taxes-and-how-much-money-do-they-raise (last visited Jan. 11, 2019) (noting 1940 as date of first recording).
123. See Templin, supra note 120, at 11 (documenting the steady increase in rate and tax maximum); see also Research, Statistics & Policy Analysis, OASDI and SSI Program Rates & Limits,
2020, SOC. SECURITY ADMIN., (Oct. 2019), https://www.ssa.gov/policy/docs/quickfacts/prog_highlights/index.html (listing tax rate and maximum taxable earnings as of 2020); Source
of Revenue as Share of GDP, TAX POL’Y CTR. (July 18, 2019), http://www.taxpolicycenter.org/statistics/source-revenue-share-gdp (providing receipts by source as a percentage of GDP).
124. See Publication 15 (2020), (Circular E), Employer’s Tax Guide, INTERNAL REVENUE
SERV., https://www.irs.gov/publications/p15#en_US_2020_publink1000202402 (last updated Mar.
13, 2020) (explaining that “Social security and Medicare taxes have different rates and only the
social security tax has a wage base limit.”); see also John Spencer Treu, Less Is More: Applying a
Modified Reasonable Compensation Standard to Eliminate the Inconsistencies Among the Payroll
Tax Bases and the Net Investment Income Tax Base Under the Affordable Care Act, 92 NEB. L.
REV. 586, 589–90 (2014).
125. See SOC. SEC. ADMIN., FAST FACTS & FIGURES ABOUT SOCIAL SECURITY, 2017 ii (2017),
https://www.ssa.gov/policy/docs/chartbooks/fast_facts/2017/fast_facts17.pdf (noting that 62% of
the elderly “received at least half of their income from Social Security in 2015”); see also Francine
J. Lipman, (Anti)Poverty Measures Exposed, 21 FLA. TAX REV. 389, 439–50 (2017) (discussing
and providing statistics for the role Social Security benefits play in limiting poverty).
126. Lipman, supra note 125, at 439 (citing KATHLEEN SHORT, U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, P60254, THE SUPPLEMENTAL POVERTY MEASURE: 2014 9 (2015), https://www.census.gov/content/dam/Census/library/publications/2015/demo/p60-254.pdf)).
127. See Kirsten Harrington, Employment Taxes: What Can the Small Businessman Do?, 10
AKRON TAX J. 61, 61 (1993).

2020]

HUMANS VS. ROBOTS

1025

employment tax rate shared between employers and employees (1.45% imposed on each) on all qualified earnings without a cap. 128 In 2018, Medicare
accounted for 15% of the total federal budget. 129 The initial Medicare budget
was about $10 billion for 19 million participants, and is now $705.9 billion
for 60.6 million participants. 130 Today it is the largest health insurance program in the United States and, unlike Social Security benefits, its benefits are
distributed equally to qualifying taxpayers without regard to lifetime wages
earned. 131
2. The Federal Unemployment Tax Act (“FUTA”)
The FUTA 132 serves as a social insurance to fund unemployment costs
in the United States. 133 It is imposed on employers at a rate of 6% on the first
$7000 of each employee’s earnings. 134 The FUTA provides unemployment
benefits to workers who lose jobs due to no fault of their own. 135 By providing replacement wages to unemployed workers, the FUTA tax has significantly influenced economic stability in the United States. 136 At the close of

128. See Social Security Amendments of 1965, Pub. L. No. 89-97, § 102(a), 79 Stat. 286, 291
(codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. §§1395-1395kkk-1 (2012)); Social Security Amendments of
1965, Pub. L. No. 89-97, § 121(a), 79 Stat. 286, 343 (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. §§13961396w-5 (2012)) (Medicaid); see also Juliette Cubanski et al., A Primer on Medicare: Key Facts
About the Medicare Program and the People It Covers, KAISER FAM. FOUND. (Mar. 20, 2015),
https://www.kff.org/report-section/a-primer-on-medicare-how-is-medicare-financed-and-whatare-medicares-future-financing-challenges/; Research, Statistics & Policy Analysis, supra note 123
(documenting the 2020 Medicare tax rate of 1.45%); Treu, supra note 124, at 597–98 (describing
the inception of Medicare).
129. Juliette Cubanski et al., The Facts on Medicare Spending and Financing, KAISER FAM.
FOUND. (Aug. 20, 2019), https://www.kff.org/medicare/issue-brief/the-facts-on-medicare-spending-and-financing/.
130. See Anderson, supra note 121.
131. See Treu, supra note 124, at 598 (further documenting that Medicare benefits apply to
persons “who are sixty-five years or older and who worked for at least forty quarters, or ten years,
in Medicare-covered employment”); see also Michael J. DeBoer, Medicare Coverage Policy and
Decision Making, Preventive Services, and Comparative Effectiveness Research Before and After
the Affordable Care Act, 7 J. HEALTH & BIOMEDICAL L. 493, 501 (2012) (discussing Medicare
eligibility, which includes individuals sixty-five and over, spouses, individuals under sixty-five
years of age with certain disabilities, and those with end-stage renal disease).
132. I.R.C. §§ 3301–11 (2012).
133. See Harrington, supra note 127, at 62 (discussing FUTA’s purpose).
134. See id.; see also I.R.C. § 3301; Robyn L. Robinson, A Discussion of the Application of
FICA and FUTA to Indian Tribes’ On-Reservation Activities, 25 AM. INDIAN L. REV. 37, 40 (20002001) (providing an explanation of the Federal Unemployment Tax Act).
135. See Charles P. Sabatino & Simi Litvak, Liability Issues Affecting Consumer-Directed Personal Assistance Services—Report and Recommendations, 4 ELDER L.J. 247, 270 (1996).
136. See Price, supra note 115, at 30.
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2017, 1.87 million people were receiving unemployment insurance benefits. 137
B. The Effect of U.S. Employment Tax Policy
Revenue generated by the payroll tax is vital to the promotion of U.S.
economic stability. Only the individual income tax collects more federal revenue. 138 The payroll tax base is particularly broad, and the supply of workers
since its inception has helped maintain revenue production; 139 however, the
tax significantly burdens low and middle income taxpayers as compared to
higher income workers. 140
Scholars and policy advocates have raised concerns about employment
tax disparity. 141 Using the measure of effective tax rate, the payroll tax is
substantially more burdensome on wage earners as compared to wealthy investors. 142 For numerous working class taxpayers, the employment tax is a
larger financial burden than that of the income tax. 143 Only within households where incomes reach the six figure mark does the income tax owed
137. Joseph Lawler, Number of Workers Receiving Unemployment Benefits Falls to Lowest
Level in 44 Years, WASH. EXAMINER (Jan. 11, 2018, 8:36 AM), https://www.washingtonexaminer.com/number-of-workers-receiving-unemployment-benefits-falls-to-lowest-level-in-44years.
138. See Federal Payroll Taxes, CTR. BUDGET & POL’Y PRIORITIES (Apr. 17, 2020),
https://www.cbpp.org/sites/default/files/atoms/files/10-17-12tax.pdf (noting that in 2019, 35.9% of
federal revenue was generated from the payroll tax); see also Linda Sugin, Payroll Taxes, Mythology, and Fairness, 51 HARV. J. ON LEGIS. 113, 118 (2014) (noting role that payroll tax plays in the
United States).
139. See John Olson, Payroll Taxes: The Good, the Bad, and the Solutions, TAX FOUND. (Aug.
2, 2016), https://taxfoundation.org/payroll-taxes-good-bad-and-solutions/ (implying that tax evasion of payroll taxes is difficult due to the requisite withholding requirements at the employer level).
140. See Dexter, supra note 17, at 371; see also Policy Basics: Top Ten Facts About Social
Security, supra note 12.
141. See Sugin, supra note 138, at 119 (stating it is difficult to argue the fairness of the payroll
tax); see also Deborah A. Geier, Integrating the Tax Burdens of the Federal Income and Payroll
Taxes on Labor Income, 22 VA. TAX REV. 1, 6 (2002) (questioning whether the distribution of the
tax burden with regard to Social Security and Medicare rates and wage bases is “fair”); Michael J.
Graetz, The Troubled Marriage of Retirement Security and Tax Policies, 135 U. PA. L. REV. 851,
852 (1987) (arguing that there is unfairness in the social security tax and payments scheme); Dan
Seltzer, Attacks on a Tax: An Alternative to the Earned Income Tax Credit to Remedy the Unfairness
in the Payroll Tax System, 77 S. CAL. L. REV. 187, 187 (2003) (stating that the payroll tax “fall[s]
disproportionately on the poor and middle-class”); Templin, supra note 120, at 28 (discussing the
disparities in wage growth between workers and the fairness of the regressive payroll tax).
142. See Sugin, supra note 138, at 113 (noting that the payroll tax is only imposed on wages,
thus reducing or eliminating the tax burden on the wealthy who earn money via investment opportunities); see also Geier, supra note 141, at 3 (stating that the payroll tax “results in a “higher portion
of the federal tax burden being borne by labor income (as opposed to capital income, which is concentrated in the wealthier households)”).
143. See Howard Gleckman, For Most Households, It’s About the Payroll Tax, Not the Income
Tax, TAX POL’Y CTR. (Apr. 2, 2015), http://www.taxpolicycenter.org/taxvox/most-households-itsabout-payroll-tax-not-income-tax (noting that a 2015 report by the Joint Committee on Taxation
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exceed that of the payroll tax. 144 Additionally, although the tax is shared
between employers and employees, employers can eliminate their portion by
crafting downward adjustments in salaries and wages. 145
Despite claims of unfairness, politicians have been reluctant to enter into
this discussion, instead preferring to focus debate on the income tax. 146 Although the income tax is the largest revenue source for the federal government, politicians’ hesitancy to address the employment tax is troubling considering that, in 2016, 44% of households paid zero dollars in federal income
tax while 60% were subject to the FICA tax. 147
The payroll tax underpinning requires that the federal government collect revenue from present-day workers to fund current beneficiaries. 148 Although more than 60 million people rely on benefits generated by the employment tax, the long-term sustainability of the Social Security program could
be jeopardized due to two demographic swings—the continuous retirement
of baby boomers and the increasing life expectancies of Americans.149 U.S.
Census data supports that 10,000 of the total estimated 73 million baby
boomers turn age sixty-five every day, and the entire baby boomer population
will be sixty-five or older by 2030. 150 In addition, the average life expectancy
in 1935 was 61.9 years; since then, life expectancy in the United States has

found that 80 million low-earning taxpayers pay no federal income tax but pay $121 billion in payroll taxes, while middle-income families pay three times as much in payroll taxes as federal income
tax); see also Geier, supra note 141, at 18 (documenting that payroll taxes are not creditable against
the income tax due nor deductible by employees under the income tax).
144. See id.; see also Sugin, supra note 138, at 119 (acknowledging that “[t]he income tax exceeds the payroll tax only for the top quintile of taxpayers”).
145. See Sugin, supra note 138, at 119.
146. See Geier, supra note 141, at 3 (noting that few politicians speak about the payroll tax,
instead allowing debates to center on the federal income tax burden).
147. See Roberton C. Williams, Most Americans Pay More Payroll Tax than Income Tax, TAX
POL’Y CTR.: TAXVOX (Sept. 6, 2016), https://www.taxpolicycenter.org/taxvox/most-americanspay-more-payroll-tax-income-tax.
148. See Dexter, supra note 17, at 351.
149. See Sean Williams, Republican Efforts to Reform Social Security Could Financially Cripple Most Seniors, MOTLEY FOOL (Jan. 1, 2017, 6:02 AM), https://www.fool.com/retirement/2017/01/01/republican-efforts-to-reform-social-security-could.aspx.
150. America Counts Staff, 2020 Census Will Help Policymakers Prepare for the Incoming
Wave of Aging Boomers, U.S. CENSUS BUREAU (Dec. 10, 2019), https://www.census.gov/library/stories/2019/12/by-2030-all-baby-boomers-will-be-age-65-or-older.html.
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increased to 78.86 years. 151 This surge has resulted in qualifying persons
receiving benefits for lengthier periods of time. 152
These statistics raise important questions about whether employment
tax revenue is sufficient to sustain Social Security and Medicare benefits in
the future. 153 It is estimated that 88.4 million beneficiaries will be entitled to
receive $1.672 trillion in benefits by 2035. 154 The Social Security Act reports
that there are currently 2.8 workers per Social Security beneficiary; however,
this number is expected to drop to 2.3 workers per beneficiary by 2035. 155
This future projection does not take into account recent research estimates
regarding the impact of automation substitution in the workforce.
Social Security and Medicare continue to be instrumental in realizing
social policy goals by providing necessary insurance and healthcare to stabilize the U.S. economy. In addition, the FUTA tax revenue provides essential
benefits to unemployed workers. Automation substitution, however, is
threatening the continued viability of these programs. Employment tax policy goals cannot be realized if they are undermined by the promotion of innovation. U.S. innovation tax policy, which evolved from more generalized
innovation policy, supports invention stimulation. 156 Although tax incentives
can improve social welfare by motivating research and development, the public benefit must be more than consumers’ use of invention. As discussed in
the following Part, evolving innovation policy has shifted away from social
welfare goals towards increased economic advancement, resulting in a disharmony with U.S. employment tax policy.
151. See Life Expectancy in the USA, 1900–98, BERKELEY DEMOGRAPHY, http://www.demog.berkeley.edu/~andrew/1918/figure2.html (last visited Jan. 11, 2018); see also Life Expectancy
All Races, WORLDLIFEEXPECTANCY.COM, http://www.worldlifeexpectancy.com/usa/life-expectancy (last visited Jan. 11, 2019).
152. See Adi Libson, Confronting the Retirement Savings Problem: Redesigning the Saver’s
Credit, 54 HARV. J. ON LEGIS. 207, 216 (2017) (noting that increased life expectancy and reduced
mortality rates impact Social Security solvency).
153. See Templin, supra note 120, at 1–3 (generally assessing policy options of increasing the
retirement age); see also Jagadeesh Gokhale, Social Security Reform: Does Privatization Still Make
Sense?, 50 HARV. J. ON LEGIS. 169, 169 (2013) (discussing the privatization of Social Security as
the program heads for insolvency due to the onslaught of baby boomer retirements); Martha Holstein & Kristen Pavle, The “Crisis” in Retirement Security: Social Security Is the Answer, Not the
Problem, 46 J. MARSHALL L. REV. 719, 719 (2013) (addressing the threats to retirement security);
Peter H. Schuck, The Golden Age of Aging, and Its Discontents, 18 ELDER L.J. 25, 27 (2010) (noting
the approaching insolvency of Social Security and Medicare); Alexander G. Karl, Note, Uncle Sam
Killed Grandma: How the Estate Tax Can Help Alleviate Medicare Uncertainty, 25 ELDER L.J. 443,
445 (2018) (proposing the sustainability of Medicare funding through the federal Estate Tax).
154. Henry Aaron, How to Keep Social Security Secure, AM. PROSPECT (May 1, 2018),
http://prospect.org/article/how-keep-social-security-secure (designating that benefit amount in 2017
dollars).
155. See Fact Sheet, SOC. SECURITY ADMIN., https://www.ssa.gov/news/press/factsheets/basicfact-alt.pdf (last visited Jan. 11, 2019).
156. See infra text accompanying notes 170–179.
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III. INNOVATION TAX POLICY AND INDUSTRIALIZATION
While U.S. employment tax policy originated with adoption of the
OASDI, innovation tax policy—dedicated to unlocking innovation potential—evolved incrementally from the time of the founding fathers.157 Intellectual property protection dates back to the United States Constitution,
which gives Congress the power “[t]o promote the Progress of Science and
useful Arts, by securing for limited Times to Authors and Inventors the exclusive Right to their respective Writings and Discoveries.” 158 Mindful of
the importance of innovation, the founding fathers sought to preserve inventors’ ability to reap the economic fruits of their labors by ensuring ownership
rights to their creations. 159
In 1813, Thomas Jefferson noted that intellectual property rights not
only afford profits to those pursuing innovation but also benefit society. 160
The United States Supreme Court has repeatedly acknowledged Jefferson’s
perspective and recognized both social and economic benefits of intellectual
property. 161 Similarly, scholars also note innovation policy’s twin goals of
economic progress and knowledge spillover. 162
157. See Jeffrey Owens, Taxes for Innovation, OECD OBSERVER, http://oecdobserver.org/news/fullstory.php/aid/3271/Taxes_for_innovation.html (last visited Jan. 11, 2019) (discussing how taxes can spur innovation).
158. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8.
159. See THE FEDERALIST No. 43 (James Madison) (“The right to useful inventions seems with
equal reason to belong to the inventors.”); see also Jennifer L. Case, How the America Invents Act
Hurts American Inventors and Weakens Incentives to Innovate, 82 UMKC L. REV. 29, 51, 62
(2013).
160. Loletta Darden, Lights, Lights, Lights! Finding Light in the Darkness of The Public/ Private
Patent Debate, 9 AM. U. INTELL. PROP. BRIEF 106, 143 (2018) (citing Letter from Thomas Jefferson
to Isaac McPherson (Aug. 13, 1813), in 13 THE WRITINGS OF THOMAS JEFFERSON 326, 335 (Andrew A. Lipscomb & Albert Ellery Bergh eds., 1903)).
161. See Graham v. John Deere Co., 383 U.S. 1, 8–9 (1966) (stating that Jefferson “clearly
recognized the social and economic rationale of the patent system”); see also Mazer v. Stein, 347
U.S. 201, 219 (1954) (“The economic philosophy behind the clause empowering Congress to grant
patents and copyrights is the conviction that encouragement of individual effort by personal gain is
the best way to advance public welfare through the talents of authors and inventors in ‘Science and
useful Arts.’”).
162. See, e.g., Harry First, Controlling the Intellectual Property Grab: Protect Innovation, Not
Innovators, 38 RUTGERS L. J. 365, 374 (2007) (clarifying that the economic philosophy behind
innovation entails both personal gain and public welfare advancement); Thomas L. Hayslett III,
1995 Antitrust Guidelines for the Licensing of Intellectual Property: Harmonizing the Commercial
Use of Legal Monopolies with the Prohibitions of Antitrust Law, 3 J. INTELL. PROP. L. 375, 378–79
(1996) (noting that intellectual property law maximizes consumer welfare by promoting investment
in innovation while also extending to inventors “the carrot of supracompetitive profits”); Maayan
Perel, An Ex Ante Theory of Patent Valuation: Transforming Patent Quality into Patent Value, 14
J. HIGH TECH L. 148, 200 (2014) (evaluating that patents incentivize innovation under the economic
basis, and that incentivizing innovation results in increased public welfare); Arti Kaur Rai, Regulating Scientific Research: Intellectual Property Rights and the Norms of Science, 94 NW. U. L.
REV. 77, 116 (1999) (discussing that the traditional economic justification for granting patent rights
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Although both economic progress and social welfare have long been
noted as the underpinning of U.S. innovation policy, the United States has
allowed the pursuit of economic progress to eclipse the importance of social
benefits in innovation tax policy. To support such conclusion, this Part discusses U.S. innovation policy and economic and social benefits. This Part
also demonstrates how innovation tax policy evolved from a broader innovation policy and provides evidence that innovation tax policy has shifted its
focus from social welfare towards economic progress.
A. U.S. Innovation Policy
U.S. policy expressly seeks to advance innovation. 163 Indeed, the
United States employs an arsenal of tools to ensure that its citizens reap the
benefits of continued technological advancement. 164 As previously noted,
the United States Constitution and other federal law 165 provides limited time
is to incentivize persons to create for the public good); Mark A. Lemley, Romantic Authorship and
the Rhetoric of Property, 75 TEX. L. REV. 873, 902–03 (1997) (reviewing JAMES BOYLE, SHAMANS,
SOFTWARE, AND SPLEENS: LAW AND THE CONSTRUCTION OF THE INFORMATION SOCIETY (1996))
(elevating the public interest goal by characterizing intellectual property rights as “a necessary
evil—a restriction on the free flow of information to the minimum extent necessary to encourage
needed investment in innovation.”).
163. See James Goh, Primer: Innovation Policy in the United States, UNIV. OF PA. PUB. POL’Y
INITIATIVE (Apr. 28, 2017), https://publicpolicy.wharton.upenn.edu/live/news/1840-primer-innovation-policy-in-the-united-states (analyzing the effects of U.S. innovation policy and noting that
“the United States has implemented a slew of innovation policies”).
164. See Michael J. Graetz & Rachael Doud, Technological Innovation, International Competition, and the Challenges of International Income Taxation, 113 COLUM. L. REV. 347, 350 (2013);
see also infra notes 165–172 and accompanying text.
165. Following the adoption of Article 1, Section 8 of the U.S. Constitution, the Patent Act of
1790 was established, followed by the revised Patent Act of 1793. Almost half a century later a
major revision resulted in the 1836 Patent Act, designating the U.S. Patent Office as an executive
agency, and in 1890 Congress passed the Sherman Act to address improper business monopolizations. Modern reform to the U.S. patent system came with the enactment of the Patent Act of 1952.
Since then, case law has served as the prominent outlet for the continued evolution of U.S. patent
law, with the 2011 Leahy-Smith America Invents Act (“AIA”) representing the most significant
legislative change to the U.S. patent system since 1952. See Patent Act of 1790, Ch. 7, 1 Stat. 109;
Patent Act of 1793, Ch. 11, 1 Stat. 318; Patent Act of 1836, Ch. 357, 5 Stat. 117; Sherman Antitrust
Act of 1890, Ch. 647, 26 Stat. 209; Patent Act of 1952, Pub. L. No. 82-593, 66 Stat. 792; LeahySmith America Invents Act (AIA), Pub. L. No. 112-29, 125 Stat. 284 (2011); see also Diane Lu,
Note, In the Face of Strong Patent Rights: Using The Foreign Trade Antitrust Improvements Act to
Combat Patent Abuse in International Commerce, 21 B.U. J. SCI. & TECH. L. 136, 146–48 (2015)
(documenting the adoption of the Sherman Act to combat anticompetitive behavior relating to U.S.
patents); A Brief History of The Patent Law of the United States, LADAS & PARRY (May 7, 2014),
https://ladas.com/education-center/a-brief-history-of-the-patent-law-of-the-united-states-2/ (discussing the major and minor changes to patent law included in the 1952 revision); see also Alice
Corp. v. CLS Bank Int’l, 573 U.S. 208, 212 (2014) (holding that claims directed to abstract ideas
require additional elements capable of rendering them significantly more than the abstract ideas
themselves); KSR Int’l Co. v. Teleflex Inc., 550 U.S. 398, 415 (2007) (providing that certain considerations must be given to determine the obviousness of a patent claim); Diamond v. Diehr, 450
U.S. 175, 184 (1981) (determining that controlling the execution of a physical process by running a
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legal monopolies in the form of copyrights and patents (among others). 166
The federal government also uses prizes and grants to incentivize innovation. 167 More than two dozen federal agencies and departments directly fund
research and development (“R&D”) activities.168 In fiscal year 2016, this
funding topped $142 billion. 169 In addition to direct expenditures, the United
States also makes extensive use of tax expenditures to promote innovation. 170
Tax expenditures are tax code provisions that preference certain activities or
taxpayers. 171 Tax expenditures may take the form of exclusions, deductions,
deferrals, credits, or tax rates. 172 Innovation preferences enjoy wide political
and public support, and tax incentives for innovation have been particularly
popular. 173
1. Innovation Policy Goal: Economic Progress
Innovation policy is strongly linked, both economically and politically,
to prosperity. 174 The United States, as well as other nations, view innovation-

computer does not preclude the patentability of the invention in its entirety); Diamond v.
Chakrabarty, 447 U.S. 303, 304 (1980) (holding that “a live, human-made micro-organism is patentable”); Aro Manufacturing Co. v. Convertible Top Replacement Co., 365 U.S. 336, 345–46
(1961) (redefining the U.S. patent law doctrine of repair and reconstruction); Phillips v. AWH
Corp., 415 F. 3d 1303, 1312 (Fed. Cir. 2005) (clarifying the hierarchy of evidentiary sources that
can be used for claim construction in patent law).
166. United States law also recognizes trademark rights. State laws recognize trade secret protection.
167. See Daniel J. Hemel & Lisa Larrimore Ouellette, Beyond the Patents-Prizes Debate, 92
TEX. L. REV. 303, 316 (2013) (noting the use of “prizes, patents, grants, and tax credits to incentivize
the invention and commercialization of new technologies”“); Graetz & Doud, supra note 164, at
350 (stating that the law provides “legal protections for IP; government grants, loans, and loan guarantees to both for-profit firms and not-for-profit research institutions; and tax benefits for both R&D
itself and the gains from innovation”).
168. NAT’L SCI. FOUND., SCIENCE & ENGINEERING INDICATORS 2018, at 8-74 to 8-76 (2018),
https://nsf.gov/statistics/2018/nsb20181/report/sections/invention-knowledge-transfer-and-innovation/innovation-indicators-united-states-and-other-major-economies#government-policies-andprograms-to-reduce-barriers-to-innovation (showing federal R&D expenditure by agency in fiscal
years 2011 to 2016).
169. Id. at 8-75.
170. See Hemel & Ouellette, supra note 167.
171. Briefing Book, TAX POL’Y CTR., https://www.taxpolicycenter.org/briefing-book/what-aretax-expenditures-and-how-are-they-structured (last visited Jan. 11, 2019).
172. Id.
173. See Graetz & Doud, supra note 164, at 350 (noting support as “ubiquitous”); see also Dan
L. Burk & Mark A. Lemley, Policy Levers in Patent Law, 89 VA. L. REV. 1575, 1580 (2003); Stephen E. Shay et al., R&D Tax Incentives: Growth Panacea or Budget Trojan Horse?, 69 TAX L.
REV. 419, 419–20 (2016) (remarking that supporting R&D tax incentives “is the tax equivalent of
embracing motherhood and apple pie”).
174. See Graetz & Doud, supra note 164, at 388 (noting impact of technological innovation on
national wealth and discussing the spillover effects of research and development).
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based productivity increases as an economic catalyst and critical to improving national and global standards of living. 175 The general public believes,
and many scholars concur, that the competitiveness of the national economy
hinges on technological advancement 176: “Achieving preeminence in high
technology is widely viewed as a critical element of the economic competitiveness . . . .” 177 These beliefs are well-founded. Research has substantiated
the link between innovation and productivity, 178 and pro-innovation federal
policy has been correlated with increased U.S. manufacturing productivity. 179
U.S. policymakers have asserted both implicitly and explicitly that they
assume innovation increases long-term productivity. 180 Pursuit of increased
productivity through technology takes the form of a public-private partnership in the United States. Although businesses own most of today’s valuable

175. See id. at 351 (noting the benefits of R&D, including substantial “geographic spillovers”
and stating, “National governments also want the resulting IP to be governed by their laws, their
citizens to be the principal beneficiaries of the economic growth resulting from technological innovations, their resident MNEs to own the resulting technology, and the tax revenues from such innovations to flow into their own treasury”).
176. See Ufuk Akcigit et al., When America Was Most Innovative, and Why, HARV. BUS. REV.
(Mar. 6, 2017), https://hbr.org/2017/03/when-america-was-most-innovative-and-why; see also
Ufuk Akcigit & Stefanie Stantcheva, Taxation and Innovation, NAT’L BUREAU ECON. RES. REP.,
Sept. 2018, at 14.(noting the relationship between innovation, technological progress, and economic
growth); Darrell M. West, Technology and the Innovation Economy, CTR. FOR TECH. INNOVATION
AT
BROOKINGS
(Oct.
19,
2011),
https://www.brookings.edu/wp-content/uploads/2016/06/1019_technology_innovation_west.pdf (noting results of 2009 survey showing overwhelming belief in innovation’s importance to economy).
177. Linda A. Mabry, Multinational Corporations and U.S. Technology Policy: Rethinking the
Concept of Corporate Nationality, 87 GEO. L.J. 563, 567 (1999).
178. See Åsa Hansson & Cécile Brokelind, Tax Incentives, Tax Expenditures Theories in R&D:
The Case of Sweden, 6 WORLD TAX J. 168, 176 (2014) (“[S]tudies based on European data have
found that R&D activities improve productivity and stimulate economic growth.”).
179. See Graetz & Doud, supra note 164, at 388 (“Productivity has increased, reducing the
number of employees required to produce similar output. The average American factory worker
now produces $180,000 worth of goods a year, which is more than three times what he would have
produced in 1978 in today’s dollars. Further, while the number of U.S. manufacturing jobs has
decreased from twenty million in 1979 to twelve million today, value added in U.S. manufacturing
increased by more than two-thirds during that period.” (citing ENRICO MORETTI, THE NEW
GEOGRAPHY OF JOBS 10–17 (2012))); see also Hansson & Brokelind, supra note 178, at 175 (noting
increasing productivity and spillover effects to other businesses and industries).
180. See Preface to CONG. BUDGET OFFICE, FEDERAL SUPPORT FOR RESEARCH AND
DEVELOPMENT
VII–XII,
1
(2007),
https://www.cbo.gov/sites/default/files/cbofiles/ftpdocs/82xx/doc8221/06-18-research.pdf (noting direct and indirect subsidies
for innovation in that “lawmakers have provided about $137 billion in budget authority to support
federal research and development (R&D) activities” and that “tax preferences are in place to encourage the private sector to increase its R&D spending”). This report also notes productivity gains
of innovation. Id.; see also CONG. BUDGET OFFICE, R&D AND PRODUCTIVITY GROWTH 2 (2005)
(presenting the theoretical premise and evidence for a link between research and development
spending and productivity growth); Lital Helman, Curated Innovation, 49 AKRON L. REV. 695, 701
(2016) (finding governmental innovation incentive instruments, including grants or prizes).
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intellectual property, 181 the federal government endeavors to create opportunities for collaboration among industry, academia, and the government to
stimulate creativity and innovation.182 However, U.S. innovation policy requires that economic progress be balanced against the twin goal of preserving
public knowledge and welfare.
2.

Innovation Policy Goal: Advancing Public Knowledge and
Welfare

In addition to economic progress, a primary objective of U.S. innovation
policy is to enhance social welfare with knowledge spillover. 183 Thomas Jefferson characterized intellectual property as a public good, declaring that
“ideas should freely spread from one to another over the globe, for the moral
and mutual instruction of man.” 184
This perspective continues to find support centuries later. The United
States Supreme Court has expressly noted public benefit as the foundational
principle for intellectual property rights.185 Three times during the mid-twentieth century the Court cited public knowledge and interest as primary motivations for intellectual property rights. In 1948, the Court identified the “benefits derived by the public from the labors of authors” as the primary purpose
of intellectual property rights. 186 Less than ten years later, the Court noted
that “[t]he economic philosophy behind the [intellectual property] clause . . .
is the conviction that encouragement of individual effort by personal gain is
the best way to advance public welfare.” 187 Later, in 1966, the Court cited to

181. See Stephanie Plamondon Bair, Innovation Inc., 32 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 713, 716 (2017)
(citing Jeanne C. Fromer, Expressive Incentives in Intellectual Property, 98 VA. L. REV. 1745,
1779–81 (2012)).
182. See Rishi Iyengar, These Three Countries Are Winning the Global Robot Race, CNN BUS.
(Aug. 21, 2017, 10:14 AM), http://money.cnn.com/2017/08/21/technology/future/artificial-intelligence-robots-india-china-us/index.html; see also Stanley “Skip” Pruss, The Case for Clean Energy
Technology Manufacturing: Ten Steps Business and Industry Must Take to Optimize Opportunities
in the Emerging Clean Energy Economy, 18 MICH. TELECOMM. TECH. L. REV. 349, 360 (2011)
(noting the collaborative efforts the United States has taken to remain a leader in global innovation).
183. See Ramsey Hanna, Misusing Antitrust: The Search for Functional Copyright Misuse
Standards, 46 STAN. L. REV. 401, 420 (1994).
184. See Graham v. John Deere Co., 383 U.S. 1, 9 n.2 (1966) (quoting VI WRITINGS OF THOMAS
JEFFERSON 180–81 (H. A. Washington ed. 1861)).
185. See Fogerty v. Fantasy, Inc., 510 U.S. 517, 524 (1994) (“The primary objective of the
Copyright Act is to encourage the production of original literary, artistic, and musical expression
for the good of the public.”); Feist Publ’ns, Inc. v. Rural Tel. Serv. Co., 499 U.S. 340, 349–50 (1991)
(stating that the public interest is the “primary objective of copyright”); Stewart v. Abend, 495 U.S.
207, 228 (1990) (stating that copyright balances “the artist’s right to control [his or her] work” with
“the public’s need for access”).
186. United States v. Paramount Pictures, Inc., 334 U.S. 131, 158 (1948).
187. Mazer v. Stein, 347 U.S. 201, 219 (1954).
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Jefferson to support the proposition that “[t]he patent monopoly was not designed to secure to the inventor his natural right in his discoveries. Rather, it
was a reward, an inducement, to bring forth new knowledge.” 188
One scholar so elevates the public interest in innovation that he characterizes intellectual property rights as “a necessary evil—a restriction on the
free flow of information to the minimum extent necessary to encourage
needed investment in innovation.” 189 Indeed, some argue that intellectual
property rights for innovation are warranted because innovation provides “a
net benefit to society” in that the promotion of innovation swaps “the disutility of restricted output and higher prices for the greater social utility . . . that
might otherwise not be produced.” 190
The concern that firms underinvest in innovation is often used to justify
governmental efforts to incentivize innovation, whether through intellectual
property rights, grants, or tax expenditures. Economic theory suggests that
innovation suffers from market failure because discoveries and inventions are
often nonexcludable, meaning that—without the help of interventions like
intellectual property rights—a creator often cannot prevent others from using
his or her invention. 191 Nonexcludable goods like discoveries are “expensive
to produce but easy to appropriate.” 192 Innovation is also often nonrivalrous,
meaning that the knowledge manifested in a discovery or invention can be
used repeatedly for no additional cost. 193 Innovation’s nature as nonrivalrous
and nonexcludable makes it a public good. 194 Consequently, firms cannot
solely capture the benefits of innovation—they share at least some of the
benefits with the public. For these reasons, among others, economic theory

188. Graham, 383 U.S. at 9.
189. Lemley, supra note 162, at 902–03.
190. Burk & Lemley, supra note 173, at 1580; see also ROBERT P. MERGES, JUSTIFYING
INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY 2 (2011) (noting IP law as seeking “to maximize the net social benefit
of the practices it regulates”); Jacob Nussim & Anat Sorek, Theorizing Tax Incentives for Innovation, 36 VA. TAX REV. 25, 31 (2017) (opining that “[m]arket failures represent situations in which
free competitive markets do not necessarily accomplish first best optimal outcomes, and therefore,
government intervention may be warranted in order to fix the failures—and in our case, to induce
further innovation”); Shay et al., supra note 173, at 419–20.
191. See Burk & Lemley, supra note 173, at 1580.
192. Id.
193. See Nussim & Sorek, supra note 190, at 31 (discussing the market failures and nonrivalrous
nature of information and its production).
194. See id.; see also Burk & Lemley, supra note 173, at 1580.
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suggests that firms are under-incentivized to invest in innovation195 and must
be offered an incentive to engage in a desirable level of innovation. 196
Economic theory also suggests that “innovation responds to incentives,”
and firms are enticed by the hanging carrot of financial gain to engage in
more desirable levels of innovation. 197 Some scholars argue that inducements like tax incentives are necessary to drive the U.S. economy forward
while also benefitting the social welfare. 198 The need for incentives to further
promote R&D brought about the birth of innovation tax policy in the United
States.
B. Tax in U.S. Innovation Policy
Although the Constitution and early patent laws secured intellectual
property rights at the nation’s inception, innovation and intellectual property
received no special treatment for income tax purposes.199 Innovation tax policy did not begin taking shape until the 1954 U.S. Tax Code (the “Code”)

195. See Burk & Lemley, supra note 173, at 1580; Hansson & Brokelind, supra note 178, at
175 (stating that knowledge is “a public good and “for efficiency reasons, should be distributed to
others to use at no cost” because of the inability to exclude others); see also Shay et al., supra note
173, at 419–20.
196. MERGES, supra note 190, at 2 (“Society offers above-market rewards to creators of certain
works that would not be created, or not created as soon or as well, in the absence of reward.”). The
concept of innovation being nonrivalrous and nonexcludable promotes the public good, but without
additional gratification has historically resulted in firms being under-incentivized to invest in innovation. See Burk & Lemley, supra note 173, at 1580 (providing that the patent system promotes
innovation through exclusive rights); Hansson & Brokelind, supra note 178, at 175 (discussing the
nature of knowledge production); Shay et al., supra note 173, at 419–20 (noting that the United
States advances R&D through expenditures and tax policies).
197. Lisa Larrimore Ouellette, Patent Experimentalism, 101 VA. L. REV. 65, 75 (2015); see also
MERGES, supra note 190, at 2 (discussing the economic incentives necessary for the production of
intellectual property).
198. See Burk & Lemley, supra note 173, at 1580 (noting the purpose of a “net benefit to society” when discussing government inducements for innovation); see also MERGES, supra note 190,
at 2 (noting the goal of social benefit in intellectual property law); Nussim & Sorek, supra note 190,
at 31 (discussing the government action to remedy innovation market failure); Shay et al., supra
note 173, at 419–20.
199. See Xuan-Thao Nguyen & Jeffrey A. Maine, The History of Intellectual Property Taxation:
Promoting Innovation and Other Intellectual Property Goals?, 64 SMU L. REV. 795, 811–13 (2011)
(providing a comprehensive history of the taxation of intellectual property law noting that
“[a]lthough it was well-established that intellectual property was property, many early tax cases
struggled to identify when intangible intellectual property rights constituted separable property for
tax purposes”).
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revision. 200 Prior to this mid-twentieth-century revision, the courts, taxpayers, and the Internal Revenue Service applied tangible property tax laws to
intangible know-how and creations. 201
In 1954, Congress adopted two provisions to govern intellectual property taxation. Congress enacted the first of these, Internal Revenue Code
section 174, to incentivize investment in R&D. 202 This section, which was
recently amended in 2017, 203 allows taxpayers to “treat research or experimental expenditures . . . as expenses which are not chargeable to capital account.” 204 It allows taxpayers to immediately deduct from their gross income
R&D expenses connected to their businesses, reducing the tax basis. 205 Without section 174, these expenses would otherwise be capitalized and could not
be recouped without a realization event—at an unknown time in the future.
In simple terms, investors can elect to bundle and deduct their qualifying
R&D expenses when initially incurred, thus reducing their tax liability in the
early years of research. 206 For example, if ABC Corp. spends $500,000 in
qualifying R&D expenditures in year 2021, it can elect to immediately reduce
its net income by $500,000 that same year. This provision is elective, however, and taxpayers may instead choose to capitalize their R&D expenses
over no less than a sixty-month period in which they first realize benefits
from their expenditures. 207
The second provision that Congress added during the 1954 Code revision was Internal Revenue Code section 1235. 208 This section allows patent
owners to qualify for lower, long-term capital gain tax rates when selling

200. Id. at 831.
201. Professors Nguyen and Maine provide a comprehensive compilation of the long and winding road of jurisprudence courts used in using tangible property rules to determine the tax treatment
of intangible property during this period. See Nguyen & Maine, supra note 199.
202. See I.R.C. § 174(a) (2012).
203. In 2017, Internal Revenue Code section 174 was amended to ostensibly require taxpayers
to capitalize R&D expenditures beginning December 31, 2021. See I.R.C. § 174(a)(2). However,
the amendment permits R&D expenditures conducted in the United States to be amortized over a
five-year period. See I.R.C. § 174(a)(2)(B). While this change appears, on its face, to force capitalization of R&D expenses and remove the expensing benefits of section 174, a closer reading
shows that the change is only a five-year amortization. Consequently, firms are unlikely to have to
capitalize R&D expenses; the recovery is merely lengthened to five years, which is significantly
more beneficial than capitalization.
204. I.R.C. § 174(a)(1).
205. See id.; see also Xuan-Thao Nguyen & Jeffrey A. Maine, Acquiring Innovation, 57 AM.
U. L. REV. 775, 793 (2008) (discussing the origin and function of section 174); see also William A.
Drennan, Changing Invention Economics by Encouraging Corporate Inventors to Sell Patents, 58
U. MIAMI L. REV. 1045, 1059 (2004) (explaining the tax benefit accompanying section 174(a)(1)).
206. See Drennan, supra note 205, at 1135.
207. See I.R.C. § 174(b)(1).
208. See I.R.C. § 1235; see also Nguyen & Maine, supra note 205, at 794–95 (discussing the
origin and function of section 1235).
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their intellectual property rights. 209 Without section 1235, proceeds from the
sale of a patent would be taxed at the generally higher ordinary income tax
rates. 210
In the decades following the adoption of these two provisions, Congress
made minimal changes to U.S. innovation tax policy. 211 The onset of the
third industrial revolution, however, refueled Congress’s interest in stimulating innovation. Unlike the Supreme Court opinions of the mid-century that
extolled public benefits as being primary motivations for intellectual property
rights, Congress shifted its attention toward achieving economic progress
with the Economic Recovery Tax Act of 1981 (“ERTA”). 212 ERTA was designed to “ensure economic growth in the years ahead” and “stimulate
productivity and innovation throughout the economy.” 213
In the ERTA, Congress adopted Internal Revenue Code section 41, a
research credit to be used in combination with the section 174 deduction to
stimulate research activity. 214 Section 41, adopted as a temporary provision,
was extended sixteen times and ultimately made permanent in 2015. 215
Known as the Research and Experimentation (“R&E”) tax credit, section 41
rewards U.S. businesses that intensify their investment efforts in R&D. 216
This provision provides firms a dollar-for-dollar reduction in tax liability for
up to 20% of their qualified research expenses over a historical base
amount. 217 A decade later, Congress implemented Internal Revenue Code

209. See I.R.C. § 1235(a); see also Drennan, supra note 205, at 1139–40.
210. See Drennan, supra note 205, at 1139.
211. See Nguyen & Maine, supra note 199, at 831 (noting the ad hoc changes to innovation tax
policy); see e.g., I.R.C. § 177 (1982) (repealed 1986) (amended in 1956 regarding small business
issues with trademarks); I.R.C. § 170(e) (amended in 1969 regarding charitable deduction abuse by
copyright owners); I.R.C. § 1253 (amended in 1969 regarding trademark transfers).
212. See Pub. L. No. 97-34, § 101, 95 Stat. 172, 176–85.
213. See JOINT COMM. ON TAXATION, JCS-71-81, GENERAL EXPLANATION OF THE ECONOMIC
RECOVERY TAX ACT OF 1981 17 (1981).
214. See Nina J. Crimm, A Tax Proposal to Promote Pharmacologic Research, to Encourage
Conventional Prescription Drug Innovation and Improvement, and to Reduce Product Liability
Claims, 29 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 1007, 1057–58 (1994); see also Tax Treatment Legislative History, R&D COALITION, https://investinamericasfuture.org/tax-treatment-legislative-history/ (last
visited Jan. 3, 2019) (noting that section 41 was extended fifteen times until it was made permanent
in 2015).
215. GARY GUENTHER, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., RL 31181, RESEARCH TAX CREDIT:
CURRENT LAW AND POLICY ISSUES FOR THE 114TH CONGRESS Summary (2015),
https://fas.org/sgp/crs/misc/RL31181.pdf (noting that “[s]ince its enactment in mid-1981, the credit
has been extended 16 times and significantly modified 5 times”).
216. See Yair Holtzman, U.S. Research and Development Tax Credit, CPA J. (Oct. 2017),
https://www.cpajournal.com/2017/10/30/u-s-research-development-tax-credit/.
217. See I.R.C. § 41(a)(1)–(2) (2018); see also Crimm, supra note 214, at 1058–59. The base
amount is the “product of (A) the fixed-base percentage, and (B) the average annual gross receipts
of the taxpayer for the [four] taxable years preceding the taxable year for which the credit is being
determined.” Id. § 41(c)(1).
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section 197, which allows taxpayers to amortize the purchase price of intangible assets, such as patents and copyrights, over a fifteen-year period. 218
Since its temporary adoption in 1981, the section 41 R&E credit has
been so heavily employed by industry that it resulted in $10.4 billion in forgone federal revenue in 2016 and is projected to cost the federal government
$12.7 billion in 2020. 219 After the Code section was made permanent in
2015, Congress further inflated its value by allowing the research credit to
offset payroll tax obligations of qualifying small businesses (“QSBs”). 220
QSBs can now use up to $250,000 of R&E tax credit to satisfy their payroll
tax liability. 221
C. The Effect of U. S. Innovation Tax Policy
Congress adopted Internal Revenue Code sections 174 and 1235 in the
mid-twentieth century to bolster innovation and better govern intellectual
property from a tax perspective, at a time when the Supreme Court was repeatedly noting the public purpose of innovation. Innovation tax policy
changed very little from 1954 until the third industrial revolution arrived in
the 1980s. In 1981, Congress adopted the massively expensive section 41
R&E tax credit to create “economic growth” and “stimulate productivity and
innovation.” 222 The legislative history focuses solely on the economic purpose of section 41 and makes no mention of the social purposes or benefits
of innovation. The addition and ultimate permanency of the section 41 R&E
tax credit reflects a shift in innovation tax policy goals. The focus is no
longer both economic progress and knowledge spillover; by the 1980s, economic stimulus eclipsed the social benefits of innovation.
The focus on economic stimulus to the detriment of public interest manifested again in the fourth industrial revolution. In 2015, Congress amended

218. See Id. § 197(a); see also James E. Tierney, Reassessing Sales and Liquidations of Partnership Interests after the Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act of 1993, 1 FLA. TAX REV. 681, 682
(1994).
219. See JOINT COMM. ON TAXATION, JCX-3-17, ESTIMATES OF FEDERAL TAX EXPENDITURES
FOR FISCAL YEARS 2016–2020, at 29 (2017) (adding the tax expenditure projections for section 41
for corporations ($9.4 billion in 2016 and $11.4 billion in 2020) to that for individuals ($1.0 billion
in 2016 and $1.3 billion in 2020)).
220. See I.R.C. §§ 41(h), 3111(f); see also Jaime Park, David Culp & Tyrone Montague, Research Credit Made Permanent and New Potential Abilities to Use Credit to Offset AMT and Payroll Taxes, KPMG: WHAT’S NEWS IN TAX (Feb. 15, 2016), https://home.kpmg.com/content/dam/kpmg/pdf/2016/02/tnf-us-068-feb15-2016.pdf.
221. See I.R.C. §§ 41(h)(4)(B)(i), 3111(f).
222. See JOINT COMM. ON TAXATION, supra note 213, at 17.
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section 41 to allow QSBs to apply R&E tax credits to offset payroll tax obligations. 223 This provision promotes innovation at the direct expense of funding the U.S. social safety net. Tax law changes since 1980 and their legislative history suggest that disharmony is emerging between employment tax
policy and innovation tax policy.
Innovation tax policy should honor both economic progress and public
welfare. 224 Inventions provide social value; the U.S. patent system improves
social welfare and economic vitality with innovations that would otherwise
not exist absent governmental protection and regulation. 225 Tax incentives
should enhance social welfare by stimulating industry research towards advancements that have yet to be discovered.226 However, improving social
welfare through innovation must extend beyond the application of invention
to consumers’ daily lives. 227 As one scholar notes, deeper issues of “health,
safety, education, homelessness, crime prevention, environmental protection,
racial and gender discrimination, and inequality in economic opportunity”
must be considered. 228 U.S. innovation tax policy has moved away from advancing public welfare, instead incentivizing companies to continue their
R&D at the expense of social safety net funding. The resulting disconnect
between two separate tax policies of employment and innovation is further
imperiling the U.S. social safety net system, thus requiring an examination
of how to better harmonize the two through the lens of sustainability.
IV. HARMONIZING INNOVATION AND EMPLOYMENT TAX POLICY
THROUGH SUSTAINABILITY
As shown in Parts I–III, automation innovation in the fourth industrial
revolution is becoming so pervasive that it threatens to undermine the U.S.
social safety net. 229 Maintaining their current structure, the Medicare trust

223. See JOINT COMM. ON TAXATION, JCX-144-15, TECHNICAL EXPLANATION OF THE
PROTECTING AMERICANS FROM TAX HIKES ACT OF 2015, HOUSE AMENDMENT #2 TO THE SENATE
AMENDMENT TO H.R. 2029 (RULES COMMITTEE PRINT 114–40) 30 (2015),
https://www.jct.gov/publications.html?func=startdown&id=4861 (stating that “Under the provision, for taxable years beginning after December 31, 2015, a qualified small business may elect for
any taxable year to claim a certain amount of its research credit as a payroll tax credit against its
employer OASDI liability . . . .”).
224. See Brett M. Frischmann & Mark A. Lemley, Spillovers, 107 COLUM. L. REV. 257, 259–
261 (2007) (discussing social and economic spillover effects of innovation); see also Shaun P. Mahaffy, The Case for Tax: A Comparative Approach to Innovation Policy, 123 YALE L. J. 812, 819–
20 (2013) (noting reasoning for subsidizing innovation).
225. See Mahaffy, supra note 224.
226. Id.
227. See Peter Lee, Social Innovation, 92 WASH. U. L. REV. 1, 9 (2014).
228. Id.
229. See infra Parts I–III.
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fund will run out of funding in six years (2026), 230 and the Social Security
trust fund will run out of funding in fourteen years (2034). 231 Portions of
Medicare already outpace the employment tax revenues that support them. 232
With an aging population and a dramatic decrease in the number of workers
per beneficiary during the last half century, 233 the current funding structure
of Medicare and Social Security is unsustainable. 234 The aforementioned
revenue and expense estimates do not account for the projected levels of job
automation. 235 Fourth industrial revolution trends suggest that the presently
fraying U.S. social safety net may be stretched past the breaking point. 236
The U.S. social safety net is fraying in part because neither employment
tax nor innovation policy are effectively pursuing their original social goals.
Employment tax policy never contemplated the extent and rapid arrival of
automation substitution, 237 and the employment tax structure funding the social safety net cannot survive without significant revision.238 Employment
tax, in its current form, is insufficiently robust to adjust to automation substitution. 239 Simply put, employment tax is in danger of being incapable of
fulfilling its original social purpose. 240 For innovation policy, the focus has
changed from the twin goals of social benefit and economic stimulus, to the
pursuit of primarily economic goals. 241 As economic goals have eclipsed the
importance of social goals, innovation policy no longer works in concert with

230. See Robert Pear, Medicare’s Trust Fund Is Set to Run Out in 8 Years. Social Security, 16,
N.Y. TIMES (Jun. 5, 2018), https://www.nytimes.com/2018/06/05/us/politics/medicare-social-security-finances.html; see also THE BDS. OF TRS., FED. HOSP. INS. & FED. SUPPLEMENTARY MED. INS.
TR. FUNDS, 2018 ANNUAL REPORT OF THE BOARDS OF TRUSTEES OF THE FEDERAL HOSPITAL
INSURANCE AND FEDERAL SUPPLEMENTARY MEDICAL INSURANCE TRUST FUNDS 7 (2018),
https://www.cms.gov/Research-Statistics-Data-and-Systems/Statistics-Trends-and-Reports/ReportsTrustFunds/Downloads/TR2018.pdf [hereinafter MEDICARE REPORT 2018].
231. See THE BD. OF TRS., FED. OLD-AGE AND SURVIVORS INS. & FED. DISABILITY INS. TR.
FUNDS, THE 2018 ANNUAL REPORT OF THE BOARD OF TRUSTEES OF THE FEDERAL OLD-AGE AND
SURVIVORS INSURANCE AND FEDERAL DISABILITY INSURANCE TRUST FUNDS 5 (2018),
https://www.ssa.gov/oact/tr/2018/tr2018.pdf (predicting trust fund depletion in 2034).
232. See MEDICARE REPORT 2018, supra note 230, at 23 (noting expected outlays are to surpass
GDP and payroll tax growth).
233. See Pear, supra note 230 (noting reasons for the long-term financial problems as decreasing
workers per beneficiary and an aging population).
234. See id. (quoting Alex M. Azar II, the Secretary of Health and Human Services and a trustee
of Medicare and Social Security stating: “The current trajectories in health spending are both unsustainable and unmatched by increases in quality”).
235. See Acemoglu & Restrepo, supra note 88, at 1.
236. See supra Sections I, II.B.
237. See supra Section II.B.
238. See supra text accompanying notes 230–234.
239. See id.
240. See supra Section II.A.1–2.
241. See supra Section III.A–C.
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employment tax policy. Indeed, insofar as innovation policy fosters automation substitution to the detriment of the social safety net, it may undermine
employment tax policy.
Reforming employment and innovation tax policies must begin by refocusing these policies toward their goals. To that end, this Article suggests an
alternative approach to tax policy analysis. 242 Prior approaches to tax policy
analysis offer helpful insights to tax, but the most common approaches have
not rigorously interrogated the fundamental purpose of tax provisions, individually or in concert, nor have these approaches required in any regular or
systematic way tax provisions to remain true to their goals. 243 Here, this Article seeks to harmonize two areas of the law that have compatible goals,244
yet do not work in concert.
In this Part, we first explore the factors that permit ongoing disharmony
in tax analysis generally, and in employment tax and innovation tax policies
specifically. 245 Noting that current approaches to tax policy analysis provide
opportunity for disharmony, we suggest using established and accepted principles of sustainability to reform these policies. 246 We make the case that the
attributes of sustainability can assist in harmonizing disparate tax policies. 247
Finally, we apply a sustainable tax approach to employment tax and innovation tax proposals in an effort to bring them into concert. 248
A. Tax Analysis, Disharmony, and Macro Effects
In the thirty years since the major tax overhaul of 1986, 249 Congress has
most often adopted tax law incrementally. 250 There have been a few sizable
tax bills in the intervening decades, but comprehensive and concerted overhaul has not been undertaken in a holistic way. 251 While there are benefits to

242.
243.
244.
245.
246.
247.
248.
249.

See infra Section IV.B.
See infra Section IV.A.
See supra text accompanying notes 237–241.
See infra Section IV.A.
See infra Section IV.B.
See infra Section IV.B.
See infra Section IV.C.
See generally JEFFEREY H. BIRNBAUM & ALAN S. MURRAY, SHOWDOWN AT GUCCI
GULCH: LAWMAKERS, LOBBYISTS, AND THE UNLIKELY TRIUMPH OF TAX REFORM (1987) (telling
the story of 1986 tax reform).
250. See Sheldon D. Pollack, Tax Reform: The 1980’s in Perspective, 46 TAX L. REV. 489, 503–
07 (1991) (discussing incrementalism in tax reform); see also Daniel Shaviro, Beyond Public Choice
and Public Interest: A Study of the Legislative Process as Illustrated by Tax Legislation in the 1980s,
139 U. PA. L. REV. 1, 4 (1990) (noting that Congress adopted “[i]mportant, though not historic” tax
legislation “in 1982, 1984, and 1987”).
251. See, e.g., Major Enacted Tax Legislation, 1990–1999, TAX POL’Y CTR., https://www.taxpolicycenter.org/laws-proposals/major-enacted-tax-legislation-1990-1999; Major Enacted Tax
Legislation, 2000–2009, TAX POL’Y CTR., https://www.taxpolicycenter.org/laws-proposals/major-

1042

MARYLAND LAW REVIEW

[VOL. 79:1009

incremental legal revision, 252 legislation adopted in such a manner can permit
policy to stray from its motivations.
Similarly, tax law is often analyzed on a micro level in academia. This
approach permits scholars to take deep dives into the nuances of provisions
or groups of provisions. 253 To be sure, any tax lawyer or scholar will affirm
that details matter enormously in tax; 254 however, a narrow or deep dive approach does not always permit the effects of the tax code, as a whole, to be
seen on a macro level. Narrow approaches to tax analysis may not illuminate
how provisions of the Code struggle to find harmony with each other, other
legal provisions, or larger economic trends. Indeed, we argue that these
macro effects have been ignored for employment tax and innovation tax policies. 255
Compounding the effects of this approach to tax policy analysis is the
limited scholarship that interrogates foundational principles of tax and requires tax to be placed in the context of broader philosophical frameworks. 256
We are not the first to make this observation. 257 In their book, The Myth of
Ownership: Taxes and Justice, Professors Murphy and Nagel expressly critique tax scholarship, suggesting that its contextual relationship to legal,
moral, and political theory had not been adequately explored.258 In other
words, tax scholarship has not been sufficiently connected to the broader context in which it lives. Murphy and Nagel are critical of tax scholarship’s
attempts to adopt tax-specific normative concepts. They point out that com-

enacted-tax-legislation-2000-2009; Major Enacted Tax Legislation 2010–2019, TAX POL’Y CTR.,
https://www.taxpolicycenter.org/laws-and-proposals/major-enacted-tax-legislation-2010.
252. Compare CASS R. SUNSTEIN, ONE CASE AT A TIME: JUDICIAL MINIMALISM ON THE
SUPREME COURT (1999) (examining and advocating for judicial minimalism, which is an incremental approach to lawmaking), with Saul Levmore, Interest Groups and the Problem with Incrementalism, 158 U. PA. L. REV. 815 (2010) (critiquing an incremental approach to lawmaking).
253. See, e.g., Nancy J. Knauer, Critical Tax Policy: A Pathway to Reform?, 9 NW. J. L. & SOC.
POL’Y 206, 208 (2014) (noting that “tax practices can sometimes produce a string of unintended
consequences that . . . traditional tax policy would consider both irrelevant to its goals and beyond
its power to correct”); Leo P. Martinez, A Critique of Critical Tax Policy Critiques (or You’ve Got
to Speak Out Against the Madness), 28 BERKELEY LA RAZA L.J. 49, 51 (2018) (noting one criticism
of critical tax analysis as “too narrow and purposely taking a selective view through examination of
only those Code provisions that advanced a particular point of view”).
254. See, e.g., Steven A. Dean, Attractive Complexity: Tax Deregulation, the Check-the-Box
Election, and the Future of Tax Simplification, 34 HOFSTRA L. REV. 405, 406 (2005) (“Dissatisfaction with the complexity of the income tax is nothing new.”); David M. Schizer, Frictions as a
Constraint on Tax Planning, 101 COLUM. L. REV. 1312, 1315 (2001) (stating that “in recent years
the government has used . . . narrow reforms that target specific planning strategies”).
255. See supra Parts II–III.
256. See LIAM MURPHY & THOMAS NAGEL, THE MYTH OF OWNERSHIP: TAXES AND JUSTICE
3–8 (2002).
257. See id.
258. Id.
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mon tax concepts such as “vertical equity, horizontal equity, the benefit principle, equal sacrifice, [and] ability to pay” do not “adequately capture the
considerations that ought to enter into the normative assessment of tax policy.” 259 Murphy and Nagel are not alone in their criticism of tax policy analysis; similar criticism was noted three decades before they published their
book. 260
Although this weakness in tax scholarship has been noted by Murphy,
Nagel, and others, 261 it has not yet been remedied on a broadly accepted basis. 262 To that end, we suggest a different approach. 263 A superior approach
to tax scholarship would (1) require tax to identify and remain faithful to
normative foundations, (2) integrate tax policy, provisions, and goals more
holistically with other tax policies as well as other legal and economic institutions, and (3) require tax to continually adapt to societal, economic, and
technological changes destined to occur. 264
It is easy to lose sight of the concept that tax is but one tool in the regulatory arsenal. As Professor Sugin notes, “no tax system, by itself, is capable
of carrying out a conception of . . . justice, and fairness in government cannot
be determined by isolating elements of any tax system.” 265 Tax must be
viewed in context with other legal rules and relevant societal norms to understand its full effect and have any chance to effectively reform it.266 In subsequent work to The Myth of Ownership, Professor Murphy continues to argue
that, only when viewing tax in its broader context with other rules and norms,
can it be determined whether tax fulfills foundational principles. 267 Indeed,
he notes that “[a] tax scheme will be just if it finds its place in a just set of
economic and legal institutions. Economic and legal institutions, as a system,
will be just depending on how well they secure certain values—values such

259. Id. at 7–8.
260. See Lawrence Zelenak, The Myth of Pretax Income, 101 MICH. L. REV. 2261, 2262 (2003)
(reviewing LIAM MURPHY & THOMAS NAGEL, THE MYTH OF OWNERSHIP: TAXES AND JUSTICE
(2002)) (citing CARL S. SHOUP, PUBLIC FINANCE 577–78 (1969)) (noting similar criticism by Carl
Shoup).
261. See Jeffrey A. Schoenblum, Myth of Ownership/Myth of Government, 22 VA. TAX REV.
555, 586–87 (2003) (reviewing LIAM MURPHY & THOMAS NAGEL, THE MYTH OF OWNERSHIP:
TAXES AND JUSTICE (2002)) (noting that “many of the dominant concerns of taxation, such as vertical and horizontal equity and the debate over income versus consumption tax, diminish in importance or even vanish when the focus turns to first principles”).
262. See Karie Davis-Nozemack & Kathryn Kisska-Schulze, Applying Sustainability to Tax, 23
FLA. TAX. REV. (forthcoming 2020).
263. See infra Section IV.B.
264. See infra Section IV.B.
265. Linda Sugin, Theories of Distributive Justice and Limitations on Taxation: What Rawls
Demands from Tax Systems, 72 FORDHAM L. REV. 1991, 1992–93 (2004)
266. See id.
267. See Liam Murphy, Taxes, Property, Justice, 1 N.Y.U. J.L. & LIBERTY 983, 983 (2005).
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as liberty, welfare, opportunity, and personal responsibility.” 268 The approach that Murphy recommends—viewing tax in its societal context and interrogating its normative goals 269—both motivates and suggests solutions to
the issues facing the unraveling safety net. While this informs our thinking,
it is not sufficient.
The struggle to adapt and modernize tax policy when societal and economic trends arise is just as critical to tax as a lack of broader context and
foundational unmooring. 270 Legal regimes that are static provide certainty,
but they risk becoming outmoded. This is a particular concern when technology and labor market changes move so quickly. Consequently, an approach to a tax analysis should address each of those deficiencies. These
inquiries are well framed for an analysis based in sustainability. 271
B. Sustainability as a Superior Approach
We propose a sustainability approach to tax policy analysis because
“[t]he fundamental cause of the current crisis in sustainability is the industrialization that followed the industrial revolution and the rapid economic
growth it fostered.“ 272 We also propose using a sustainability approach because its attributes directly address weaknesses in prior analyses. 273 Sustainability can be viewed as a “framework for managing change.” 274 More critically important, however, sustainability asks foundational, normative
questions 275 and requires a multi-disciplinary approach focusing on longterm solutions and adjusting to changes in technology, society, and the economy. 276
From its inception, sustainability has asked whether a system “meets the
needs of the present without compromising the ability of future generations

268. Id.
269. See id.
270. See infra Section IV.B.
271. See infra Section IV.B.
272. Hiroshi Komiyama & Kazuhiko Takeuchi, Sustainability Science: Building a New Discipline, 1 SUSTAINABILITY. SCI. 1, 3–4 (2006).
273. See supra Section IV.A.
274. Keith H. Hirokawa, Saving Sustainability, 46 ENVTL. L. REP. NEWS & ANALYSIS 10151,
10151 (2016).
275. See Davis-Nozemack & Kisska-Schulze, supra note 262.
276. See infra text accompanying notes 277–304.
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to meet their own needs.” 277 This question is sustainability’s guiding principle; it directs the entry into thinking sustainably. 278 This question also invites
a dual normative and analytical enquiry. 279 In other words, it asks what needs
should be met and asks to what extent we are meeting them. 280 A dualpronged normative and analytical approach requires significant work but
promises robustness in its outcomes.
Many assume that sustainability only involves environmental protectionism; 281 however, sustainability is much broader than climate and resource
issues. 282 While there is an entire body of research across multiple disciplines
involving sustainability, 283 for the purposes of harmonizing the employment
and innovation tax policies in this paper, a few points are most critical.
277. Compare Report of the World Commission on Environment and Development: Our Common Future, 24, U.N. Doc. A/42/427 (Mar. 20, 1987) (providing a definition of and laying the
foundation for sustainable development), https://sustainabledevelopment.un.org/content/documents/5987our-common-future.pdf [hereinafter United Nations, Development Report], with R.K.
TURNER, SUSTAINABLE ENVIRONMENTAL MANAGEMENT: PRINCIPLES AND PRACTICE 12 (1988)
(defining sustainable growth differently than the United Nations as “an acceptable rate of growth in
per-capita real incomes without depleting the national capital asset stock or the natural environmental asset stock.”).
278. See United Nations, Development Report, supra note 277; see also Hirokawa, supra note
274, at 10152.
279. See Egon Becker, Thomas Jahn & Immanuel Stiess, Exploring Uncommon Ground: Sustainability and the Social Sciences, in SUSTAINABILITY AND THE SOCIAL SCIENCES: A CROSSDISCIPLINARY APPROACH TO INTEGRATING ENVIRONMENTAL CONSIDERATIONS INTO
THEORETICAL REORIENTATION 1–22 (Egon Becker & Thomas Jahn eds., 1999); see also Erich
Griessler & Beate Littig, Social Sustainability: A Catchword between Political Pragmatism and
Social Theory, 8 INT’L J. OF SUSTAINABLE DEV. 65–79 (2005).
280. See SUSTAINABILITY: CRITICAL CONCEPTS IN THE SOCIAL SCIENCES 382–83 (Michael
Redclift ed., 2005) (discussing the normative and analytical aspects, among others, of sustainability).
281. See Dave Newport, Thomas Chesnes, & Angela S. Lindner, The “Environmental Sustainability” Problem: Ensuring that Sustainability Stands on Three Legs, 4 INT’L J. OF SUSTAINABILITY
IN HIGHER ED. 357, 357 (2003) (discussing environmental primacy).
282. See Hirokawa, supra note 274, at 10152 (noting environmental and economic outcomes as
“complementary policy objectives”).
283. See, e.g., BLUE RIBBON TASK FORCE ON SUSTAINABLE DIG. PRES. & ACCESS,
SUSTAINABLE ECONOMICS FOR A DIGITAL PLANET: ENSURING LONG-TERM ACCESS TO DIGITAL
INFORMATION 9 (2010), http://brtf.sdsc.edu/biblio/BRTF_Final_Report.pdf (linking sustainability
and information management); Stefan Baumgärtner & Martin Quaas, What is Sustainability Economics?, 69 ECOLOGICAL ECON. 3, 445–50 (2010) (linking sustainability and economics); William
R. Blackburn, The Practice of Sustainability at Colleges and Universities, 46 ENVTL. L. REP. NEWS
& ANALYSIS 10394, 10394 (2016) (noting the relationship between sustainability and higher education); Wynn Calder & Richard M. Clugston, Progress Toward Sustainability in Higher Education, 33 ENVTL. L. REP. 10003, 10003 (2003) (using sustainability for higher education issues);
Iveta Cherneva, The Business Case for Sustainable Finance: Beyond Public Relations, Ethics, and
Philanthropy, 36 FLETCHER F. WORLD. AFF. 93, 96 (2012) (linking sustainability and finance);
Virginia Harper Ho, Sustainable Finance & China’s Green Credit Reforms: A Test Case for Bank
Monitoring of Environmental Risk, 51 CORNELL INT’L L.J. 609, 609 (2018); Mozaffar Khan,
George Serafeim & Aaron Yoon, Corporate Sustainability: First Evidence on Materiality, 91 ACCT.
REV. 1697–1724 (2016) (linking sustainability, accounting, and firm performance); David Millon,
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First, sustainability is much broader and implicates far more than environmentalism. 284 There are various approaches to understanding sustainability, but one of the most widely accepted is the three pillars approach.285 Under this approach, sustainability analysis looks to (1) social development, (2)
economic development, as well as (3) environmental development to understand whether a proposal will meet the needs of the present without compromising the ability of future generations to meet their own needs. 286 Much
focus in sustainability is on the environmental pillar because the effects of
climate change threaten future irreversible damage; 287 however, the three pillars are interdependent. 288 Addressing problems under sustainability requires
considering the effects on each of the pillars and necessitates a balanced approach. 289

Two Models of Corporate Social Responsibility, 46 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 523, 523 (2011) (examining sustainability and corporate governance); Stephen Kim Park & Gerlinde Berger-Walliser, A
Firm-Driven Approach to Global Governance and Sustainability, 52 AM. BUS. L. J. 255, 255 (2015)
(linking sustainability and firm governance); Stephen Kim Park, Investors as Regulators: Green
Bonds and the Governance Challenges of the Sustainable Finance Revolution, 54 STAN. J. INT’L L.
1, 6 (2018) (linking sustainability and finance); Tara J. Radin, Stakeholders and Sustainability: An
Argument for Responsible Corporate Decision-Making, 31 WM. & MARY ENVTL. L. & POL’Y REV.
363, 367 (2007) (linking sustainability and management).
284. See KENT E. PORTNEY, SUSTAINABILITY 6 (2015) (discussing the development of sustainability, including the three pillars approach).
285. See Robert W. Kates, Thomas M. Parris & Anthony A. Leiserowitz, What Is Sustainable
Development? Goals, Indicators, Values, and Practice, 47 ENV’T: SCI. & POL’Y FOR SUSTAINABLE
DEV. 8, 12 (2005), (providing historical context for sustainable development and discussing the
three pillars approach to sustainability).
286. See PORTNEY, supra note 284; see also Kates, Parris & Leiserowitz, supra note 285.
287. See, e.g., Markku Lehtonen, The Environmental-Social Interface of Sustainable Development: Capabilities, Social Capital, Institutions, 49 ECOLOGICAL ECON. 199, 199–200 (2004) (discussing the relationship amongst the three pillars); Gerald Rebitzer, David Hunkeler & Olivier Jolliett, LCC—The Economic Pillar of Sustainability: Methodology and Application to Wastewater
Treatment, 22 ENVTL. PROGRESS 241, 241 (2003) (noting the importance of each of the three pillars).
288. See Robert B. Gibson, Beyond the Pillars: Sustainability Assessment as a Framework for
Effective Integration of Social, Economic and Ecological Considerations in Significant DecisionMaking, in TOOLS, TECHNIQUES AND APPROACHES FOR SUSTAINABILITY: COLLECTED WRITINGS
IN ENVIRONMENTAL ASSESSMENT POLICY AND MANAGEMENT 389, 391 (William R. Sheate ed.,
2010) (discussing the relationship amongst the three pillars); Susan M. Opp & Kyle L. Saunders,
Pillar Talk: Local Sustainability Initiatives and Policies in the United States—Finding Evidence of
the “Three E’s”: Economic Development, Environmental Protection, and Social Equity, 49 URB.
AFF. REV. 678, 681 (2012) (discussing the interaction amongst the three pillars); see also Ralph
Hansmann, Harald A. Mieg & Peter Frischknecht, Principal Sustainability Components: Empirical
Analysis of Synergies Between the Three Pillars of Sustainability, 19 INT’L J. SUSTAINABLE DEV.
& WORLD ECOLOGY 451, 451 (2012) (exploring the relationship amongst the pillars); David Hess,
The Three Pillars of Corporate Social Reporting as New Governance Regulation: Disclosure, Dialogue, and Development, 18 BUS. ETHICS Q. 447, 449–50 (2008) (noting the pillars in sustainability).
289. See Gibson, supra note 288, at 391.
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A multi-dimensional, or three pillars, approach is appropriate to address
issues that are complex and dramatic in scale. 290 No single discipline can
solve issues as multifaceted and entrenched as climate change. 291 Similarly,
no single discipline is likely to solve other multifaceted and entrenched problems, like an eroding social safety net and dramatic changes in labor markets.
Sustainability integrates knowledge, theories, and analysis from as many disciplines as can contribute. 292 An approach that acknowledges the need for
contribution from so many scholars can be daunting; 293 however, scholarly
contribution must be broad and diverse to address complex, interdisciplinary
questions. The need for collaboration amongst academic disciplines, rather
than a single-discipline approach, can strengthen and add robustness to solutions. 294 Such collaboration presents possibilities for knowledge spillover
effects.
Sustainability is radical in its approach to the timeline for analysis. The
guiding principle of sustainability—whether a solution “meets the needs of
the present without compromising the ability of future generations to meet
their own needs” 295—inherently requires long-term thinking. This question
does not permit scholars to contemplate solutions that address only current
needs. This question acknowledges an implicit conflict amongst the resources we need for today and what we (and others) may need for tomorrow. 296 Sustainability also provides resources to people who do not yet exist,
those in future generations. This is an unusual approach for any discipline,
let alone for tax. 297 Nonetheless, the future-focus of sustainability is critical
to its ability to craft lasting and livable solutions.298

290. See Marilu Hastings, Foreword to EXAMINING INTERDISCIPLINARY SUSTAINABILITY
INSTITUTES AT MAJOR RESEARCH UNIVERSITIES: INNOVATIONS IN CROSS-CAMPUS & CROSSDISCIPLINARY MODELS i (2017).
291. See Hirokawa, supra note 274, at 10155 (noting that “environmental, economic, and social
considerations cannot be accomplished when viewed in isolation”).
292. See Gibson, supra note 288 (discussing integrative aspects of sustainability).
293. See id.; see also Komiyama & Takeuchi, supra note 272, at 3–4.
294. See Emma Partridge, “Social Sustainability”: A Useful Theoretical Framework? (Sept. 28.
2005) (unpublished manuscript, presented at the 2005 Australasian Political Science Association
Annual Conference) (noting the integrative ability of sustainability) (on file with author).
295. United Nations, Development Report, supra note 277.
296. See Sudhir Anand & Amartya Sen, Human Development and Economic Sustainability, 28
WORLD DEV. 2029, 2030 (2000) (discussing equity between generations); Amartya Sen, The Ends
and Means of Sustainability, 14 J. HUM. DEV. & CAPABILITIES 6, 6 (2013) (noting justice issues
amongst generations).
297. See Anand & Sen, supra note 296, at 2030 (noting the need for various generations to share
resources).
298. Magnus Boström, A Missing Pillar? Challenges in Theorizing and Practicing Social Sustainability: Introduction to the Special Issue, 8 SUSTAINABILITY: SCI., PRACTICE & POL’Y. 3–14
(2012).
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Sustainability also inherently embraces change. 299 Sustainability
acknowledges that today’s status quo will change. 300 Technology, society,
and the economy continually evolve. Because of this acknowledgement, sustainability seeks solutions, models, and theories that adapt to change. 301 Sustainability demands adaptability in its component parts because the complex
and interconnected problems it addresses are also constantly evolving. 302 To
ensure adaptability, it presents as an iterative process.303 Sustainability acts
like a dynamic system that cycles through asking normative questions to set
goals, measuring whether the goals have been met, and repeating the cycle
again. 304
A sustainability analysis is appropriate in addressing the fraying social
safety net because, as economist and philosopher Amartya Sen has noted, “it
is only now that humankind itself and its economic activity has reached a
scale that is potentially big enough to threaten the welfare prospects of future
generations.” 305 The impending collision of automation substitution and social safety net funding is economic activity on a scale big enough to threaten
future generations. The current collision of employment tax and innovation
tax policies sets up a classic intergenerational conflict common in sustainability issues. 306 With automation substitution and social safety net funding,
the social and economic pillars are also in conflict but must be harmonized. 307

299. See Hirokawa, supra note 274, at 10154 (noting sustainability as “pluralistic, evolving, and
adaptive”); LESLIE PAUL THIELE, SUSTAINABILITY 4 (2016) (noting sustainability’s relationship to
adaptation).
300. See Hirokawa, supra note 274, at 10154 (noting the need to incorporate “evolving needs”).
301. Komiyama & Takeuchi, supra note 272, at 5 (noting the importance of change management in sustainability).
302. See id.
303. See Efrat Eizenberg & Yosef Jabareen, Social Sustainability: A New Conceptual Framework, 9 SUSTAINABILITY 68 (2017) (noting the use of process in sustainability); see also THIELE,
supra note 299 (noting that sustainability uses a systems approach to fulfilling its goals).
304. See Gibson, supra note 288 (providing examples of iterative decisionmaking in sustainability); see also PORTNEY, supra note 284 (noting the process and systems nature of sustainability);
Griessler & Littig, supra note 279 (describing an iterative process).
305. ERIC NEUMAYER, WEAK VERSUS STRONG SUSTAINABILITY: EXPLORING THE LIMITS OF
TWO OPPOSING PARADIGMS 15 (4th ed. 2013).
306. See Hansmann, Mieg & Frischknecht, supra note 288, at 458.
307. See Anand & Sen, supra note 296, at 2039 (noting the relationship amongst the pillars to
improve the human condition).
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C. A Sustainability Approach to Employment and Innovation Tax
Policies
U.S. innovation policy has veered away from advancing social goals308
and promoted R&D at the expense of social safety net funding. 309 Automation substitution in the fourth industrial revolution further endangers the viability of social safety net programs supported by employment tax policy. 310
Employment tax policy goals cannot be fulfilled if undermined by the promotion of innovation. 311 The resulting disharmony amongst employment and
innovation tax policies is imperiling the U.S. social safety net system, requiring an examination of how better to balance the two. 312 A sustainable taxation approach to U.S. employment and innovation tax policies could help; a
sustainable taxation approach requires an interdisciplinary examination to
create complementary tax policies aimed at supporting the kind of society we
want to sustain. 313
Existing tax literature has not specifically focused on introducing methodologies to harmonize employment and innovation tax policies so they each
remain faithful to their original social goals. 314 As such, a new approach to
tax policy analysis that asks fundamental, normative questions and addresses
intergenerational equity is vital.315 Introducing a sustainability approach to
taxation invites tax scholars to engage in interdisciplinary collaboration to
explore this proposed analysis. 316 Using the lens of sustainability to harmonize tax policy will not displace other approaches currently in place but, instead, is suitably interdisciplinary and robust enough to incorporate historical
lessons. 317 As explained above, current approaches to tax scholarship are not
sufficient to tackle the issues we face; however, prior work in taxation is very
valuable and can be integrated within and support a sustainable framework.
1. Applying Sustainability to Employment Tax Proposals
A sustainability tax analysis must begin with the question of whether
U.S. employment and innovation policies “meet[] the needs of the present
without compromising the ability of future generations to meet their own

308.
309.
310.
311.
312.
313.
314.
315.
316.
317.

See supra Sections III.A, C.
See supra Sections III.A, C.
See supra Section II.B.
See supra Part II–III.
See infra Section IV.C.1–2.
See supra Section IV.B.
See supra Section IV.A.
See supra text accompanying notes 272–280, 295–298.
See supra text accompanying notes 281–294.
See supra text accompanying notes 299–304.
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needs.” 318 As explained above, Medicare and Social Security are currently
funded but are predicted to become insolvent in the next six to fourteen
years. 319 This funding structure meets neither the needs of the present nor
future generations and is likely compounded by projected levels of job automation. 320
The normative underpinning of employment tax has been long established and was explored in Section II.A. 321 The Social Security Act was to
provide welfare assistance, poverty prevention, financial security for the aging, economic stability, and labor force stabilization. 322 Program insolvency
jeopardizes these public policy goals for current and future beneficiaries. 323
Several reforms to address program insolvency have been proposed, including (1) increasing wage caps for FICA and FUTA to generate additional payroll tax revenue, (2) use of chained consumer price index (CPI) to allow benefit payments to more easily adapt to economic trends, and (3) use of postmortem austerity to recoup benefits from wealthy beneficiaries who do not
require governmental support. 324 We apply a sustainability analysis to determine their viability. 325
One of the most popular proposals has been limiting erosion of the social security wage base by lifting the cap on taxable Social Security wages. 326
Social Security wage base erosion has not been addressed since 1983. 327 Because the Social Security and Medicare Trustees have reported impending
insolvency of the trust funds to the public regularly for many years, 328 public
opinion sees merit in such a proposal and is in favor of increasing employment tax contributions to prevent insolvency. 329 Similarly, some have also
318. See United Nations, Development Report, supra note 277.
319. See MEDICARE REPORT 2018, supra note 230.
320. See Acemoglu & Restrepo, supra note 88.
321. See supra Section II.A.
322. See Altman, supra note 114; DeWitt, supra note 109; Price, supra note 115.
323. See supra Section II.B.
324. See infra text accompanying notes 326–348.
325. See infra text accompanying notes 326–348.
326. See Policy Basics: Top Ten Facts About Social Security, supra note 12.
327. Social Security Amendments Act of 1983, Pub. L. No. 98-21, 97 Stat. 65 (codified as
amended at 42 U.S.C. § 418); see also Lewis D. Solomon & Geoffrey A. Barrow, Privatization of
Social Security: A Legal and Policy Analysis, 5 KAN. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y, 9, 15 (1995) (discussing
the legislative history of the 1983 amendments).
328. See Press Release, U.S. Dep’t of Treasury, Fact Sheet: 2019 Social Security and Medicare
Trustees Reports’ (Apr. 22, 2019), https://home.treasury.gov/news/press-releases/sm665 (summarizing 2019 trustee reports, including insolvency dates).
329. See Social Security, GALLUP, https://news.gallup.com/poll/1693/social-security.aspx (last
visited Feb. 29, 2020) (finding that, in 2005, 2010, and 2015, a majority of Americans would rather
raise social security taxes than limit benefits); AARP, SOCIAL SECURITY 80TH ANNIVERSARY
SURVEY REPORT: PUBLIC OPINION TRENDS 18 (2015), https://www.aarp.org/research/topics/economics/info-2015/social-security-80th-anniversary-report.html (finding that “four in five adults age
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suggested raising the low wage base for FUTA. 330 Both of these proposals
have the benefits of increasing employment tax revenues without undermining the established goals of the programs. These reforms are not particularly
adaptive, however. One-time wage base increases or rate increases are another example of incremental change that does not adapt to future societal or
economic changes. Depending upon the size of base or rate increase, these
one-time changes also do not necessarily balance the needs of the present
with the needs of the future.
Other often discussed proposals, like the use of the chained Consumer
Price Index (often noted as “C-CPI”) instead of the Consumer Price Index
for Urban Wage Earners and Clerical Workers (“CPI-W”) to set program
benefits 331 or increase the ages of eligibility for Social Security and Medicare, 332 are also likely to address the programs’ insolvency. The use of
chained CPI is inherently more adaptive than the currently applied CPI
measures, because chained CPI is calculated monthly as opposed to biannually. 333 While more adaptive to on-the-ground economic changes, use of
chained CPI for program benefits is predicted to slow inflation adjustments

18-29 (81%) agree that they are willing to contribute more now for a more secure retirement, compared to approximately two in three or less among adults age 30-49 (68%) and 50-64 (57%)”).
330. See Unemployment Insurance: An Overview of the Challenges and Strengths of Today’s
System: Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Human Res. of the H. Comm. on Ways & Means, 114th
Cong. 7 (2016) (testimony of Judith M. Conti, Federal Advocacy Coordinator, National Employment Law Project) (proposing increase to FUTA wage base to $59,000 and indexing to Social Security); Christopher J. O’Leary, Restoring Unemployment Insurance as Social Insurance, W.E.
UPJOHN INST. EMP. RES. (Nov. 7, 2018), https://research.upjohn.org/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1058&context=presentations (proposing indexing FUTA wage base to Social Security wage
base); Increase Taxes That Finance the Federal Share of the Unemployment Insurance System,
CONG. BUDGET OFF. (Dec. 13, 2018), https://www.cbo.gov/budget-options/2018/54809 (analyzing
the proposal to expand FUTA wage base from $7000 to $40,000 and index the wage base).
331. See Emily Brandon, How the Chained CPI Affects Social Security Payments, U.S. NEWS
& WORLD REP. (Apr. 29, 2013, 9:05 AM), https://money.usnews.com/money/retirement/articles/2013/04/29/how-the-chained-cpi-affects-social-security-payments (reporting on chained CPI
for Social Security benefits); Using the Chained CPI in the Tax Code: Will Social Security Be Next?,
NAT’L COMMITTEE TO PRESERVE SOC. SECURITY & MEDICARE (Nov. 14, 2017),
https://www.ncpssm.org/documents/general-archives-2017/using-chained-cpi-tax-code-will-social-security-next (discussing the use of chained CPI).
332. See generally Anya Olsen, Mind the Gap: The Distributional Effects of Raising the Early
Eligibility Age and Full Retirement Age, 72 SOC. SECURITY BULL., Nov. 2012, at 37,
https://www.ssa.gov/policy/docs/ssb/v72n4/v72n4p37.html.; see also Philip Moeller, Should We
Raise the Retirement Age for Social Security and Medicare?, PBS NEWSHOUR (Feb. 1, 2017, 3:33
PM), https://www.pbs.org/newshour/economy/raise-retirement-age-social-security-medicare.
333. Frequently Asked Questions About the Chained Consumer Price Index for All Urban Consumers (C-CPI-U), U.S. BUREAU LABOR STAT., https://www.bls.gov/cpi/additional-resources/chained-cpi-questions-and-answers.htm#Question_4 (last modified Dec. 20, 2019) (“In its
final form, the C-CPI-U is a monthly chained price index with the expenditure weights varying each
month. The CPI-U and CPI-W, on the other hand, are biennial chained price indexes where their
expenditure weights are updated every two years.”).
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of Social Security benefits over time. 334 While CPI changes are adaptive and
assist with insolvency, such proposals threaten to undermine the welfare assistance, poverty prevention, economic, and security goals of the programs
by decreasing benefits received for current and future beneficiaries. Unlike
the chained CPI proposals, increasing eligibility age is not adaptive. Moreover, age eligibility proposals are also subject to criticism that they undermine
the public policy goals of the programs.
Other proposals, such as post-mortem austerity in which beneficiaries
receive assistance during life but can be disqualified for benefits after death
based on wealth, offer creative possibilities that could financially shore up
the programs without undermining the public policy goals for current and
future beneficiaries. 335 Post-mortem austerity is also highly adaptive and balances the needs of current and future beneficiaries. Post-mortem austerity is
the type of social safety net reform that satisfies the issue raised under a sustainability analysis and is more likely to lead to a lasting solution that fulfills
the needs of the current generation without imperiling the ability of future
generations to meet their own needs.
2. Applying Sustainability to Innovation Tax Proposals
The normative underpinning of innovation tax, as explored in Section
III.A, 336 has twin goals of increasing economic progress and improving social
welfare. 337 We have criticized innovation tax policy for evolving to prefer
economic improvements over social welfare gains. 338 The trend in innovation tax policy has been to become more generous to business, the primary
beneficiary of increased credits, deductions, and offsets. 339 The federal government has relied on economic studies as rationale for increasing tax subsidies. 340 Economic analysis of innovation tax proposals, in many cases, has
334. See Using the Chained CPI in the Tax Code, supra note 331.
335. See generally Reid Kress Weisbord, Postmortem Austerity and Entitlement Reform, 71
STAN. L. REV. ONLINE 132, 132 (2018) (proposing post-mortem austerity for Social Security benefits).
336. See supra Section III.A.
337. See supra Section III.A.
338. See supra Section III.C.
339. See ORG. FOR ECON. COOPERATION & DEV., R&D TAX INCENTIVES: UNITED STATES,
2018 (2019) (concluding that “[a]n increase in the importance of R&D tax incentives is noticeable
from 2009 onwards, both in absolute and relative terms”).
340. See generally Bettina Becker, Public R&D Policies and Private R&D Investment: A Survey
of the Empirical Evidence, 29 J. ECON. SURVEYS 917, 925 (2015) (analyzing prior literature and
concluding that “R&D tax credits have a positive effect on private R&D investment” but also finding that “most of the funding is awarded to larger firms that would have performed the R&D even
in the absence of the public subsidy, which suggests that in these cases subsidies could be targeted
more effectively”); see also, Bronwyn H. Hall, Tax Policy for Innovation 1–25 (Nat’l Bureau of
Econ. Research, Working Paper No. 25773, 2019), https://www.nber.org/papers/w25773 (surveying literature for tax credits and patent boxes).
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suggested that increasing innovation tax subsidies yields positive (or at least
not negative) revenue projections. 341 In other words, several economic studies suggest that tax subsidies for innovation pay for themselves. However,
an admitted weakness of this work is that tax subsidies can shift “the demand
curve for innovation outward by subsidizing research and development.” 342
In essence, “if the number of workers in the innovation sector (‘supply’) is
fixed,” then tax subsidies merely increase demand for these workers and consequently “may simply drive up their wages with no effect on the quantity of
innovation.” 343
Our primary criticism of this economic analysis is that it is not sufficiently interdisciplinary and does not consider other labor force and employment tax effects. Specifically, some studies focus on productivity gains, an
important and valid measure. 344 However, such productivity gains can increase the likelihood of automation substitution, which can intensify pressures on social safety revenue and benefits. The economic models used, and
data included in these models, should consider the downstream impact that
innovation has on the U.S. labor market and hence on employment tax revenues. Using a single discipline model, such as an economics-only model,
limits the utility of solutions found in this work and, more importantly, does
not acknowledge the ramifications of using the work without its broader context. Just as the usefulness of tax as a discipline is limited when it is siloed
from interdisciplinary work, the same can be said for economics.
The use of economic models is critically important to improving and
refining tax policy. 345 These models and their limited view on downstream
effects, however, are not sufficient evidence on which to base tax policy. An
interdisciplinary approach provides nuance for innovation tax models. The
appropriate inquiry is how to foster economic development, including
through innovation, while measuring downstream effects on social programs

341. See Becker, supra note 340; Hall, supra note 340, at 12 (citing a 2012 research finding that
“increase in R&D spending approximately balances or even exceeds the lost tax revenue”).
342. See Alexander M. Bell et al., Do Tax Cuts Produce More Einsteins? The Impacts of Financial Incentives vs. Exposure to Innovation on the Supply of Inventors 6 (Nat’l Bureau of Econ.
Research, Working Paper No. 25493, 2019) (citing Paul M. Romer, Should the Government Subsidize Supply or Demand in the Market for Scientists and Engineers? (Nat’l Bureau of Econ. Research, Working Paper No. 7723, 2000)), https://www.nber.org/papers/w25493.
343. Id.
344. See, e.g., Dominique Guellec & Bruno van Pottelsberghe de la Potterie, R&D and Productivity Growth: Panel Data Analysis of 16 OECD Countries, (Org. for Econ. Cooperation and Dev.,
Working Paper No. JT00109561, 2001).
345. See Neil H. Buchanan, The Role of Economics in Tax Scholarship, in BEYOND ECONOMIC
EFFICIENCY IN UNITED STATES TAX LAW 11, 22 (David A. Brennen, Karen B. Brown & Darryll K.
Jones eds., 2013) (stating that “[a]ny competent analysis of taxation must certainly address issues
that are commonly thought of as ‘economic issues’” but arguing that economic analysis has limited
application for tax scholarship, particularly in the case of pareto efficiency).
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and providing an adaptive system for pursuing both. The economics research
should be considered in light of the twin goals of increasing economic progress and improving social welfare, and the research should be used to ascertain whether it furthers these goals.
In addition to a more interdisciplinary examination of innovation tax
policy, a sustainable approach to innovation tax policy would begin with the
motivating policies of the legislation itself. 346 As we have argued above,
legislation should remain faithful to its underpinning. 347 This underpinning
can be found often, but not exclusively, in legislative histories.348 Because
innovation tax policy has strayed from its original social welfare goals, all
future innovation tax proposals should express motivating goals clearly. A
statement of purpose makes it easier to ensure that the legislation’s intended
effects are realized and consistent with these goals. 349 Establishing clear
goals is the first step towards an iterative and adaptive system. 350
In addition, the effects of innovation tax policy must be measured
broadly and regularly so as to empower the policy to become more adaptive.
These measures should examine the downstream effects on the current and
future labor force. Such measures can be generated by dynamic and predictive economic models.
In its current form, innovation tax policy is not sustainable. We recommend policy and legal changes more consistent with sustainable thinking. In
particular, we first recommend that all innovation tax legislation expressly
state its economic progress and social welfare goals. 351 Such a pronouncement is critical to forcing the legislation to remain faithful to these purposes
as it is incrementally amended over time. We also recommend that the
measures used to inform innovation tax law become more interdisciplinary
and examine downstream effects of the proposals, particularly the effects on
labor markets and social programs. 352 These measures should assist in designing adaptive—as opposed to static—policies that can adjust with new
technologies and changes in labor markets. Finally, the goals and measures
346. See supra Section IV.A.
347. See supra Section IV.A.
348. See Legislative History, BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (10th ed. 2014) (stating that it is used
to find the “intent” of a particular statute).
349. See Robert B. Gibson, Sustainability Assessment: Basic Components of a Practical Approach, 24 IMPACT ASSESSMENT & PROJECT APPRAISAL 170, 171–176, 180 (2006) (stating that
“[t]he better we understand the objective, the less likely we are to go astray in implementation efforts” and noting the importance of purpose and objectives in the sustainability process).
350. See René Kemp, Saaed Parto, & Robert B. Gibson, Governance for Sustainable Development: Moving from Theory to Practice, 8 INT.’L J. SUSTAINABLE DEV. 12, 20-21 (2005) (discussing
objective setting as part of sustainable assessment); Gibson, supra note 349 (discussing objective
setting as part of sustainability).
351. See supra text accompanying notes 346–348.
352. See supra text accompanying notes 338–345.
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should also endeavor to consider intergenerational equity effects of current
law and future proposals. 353
V. CONCLUSION
Like the three prior industrial revolutions, the current fourth industrial
revolution is altering the workplace with machinery advancements. This revolution is distinguishable from previous industrial revolutions because of the
speed of innovation improvements and unprecedented human-machine alliances. 354 Increased automation is predicted to lead to worker displacement
across countless industries, in both blue- and white-collar jobs. This level of
worker displacement threatens an already fraying social safety net.355 Although some have suggested taxing robots to limit the financial impact of automation substitution, this Article suggests that such a proposal is naïve because it conceals the underlying tension between employment tax and
innovation policies. 356
From its inception, the goal of U.S. employment tax policy was to improve social welfare. 357 Increased worker displacement caused by automation substitution could result in society’s inability to meet the benefit demands of Social Security, Medicare, and unemployment that are funded by
the employment tax. 358 The long-term sustainability of these programs is
already jeopardized, and automation substitution further threatens their viability. 359
Employment tax policy goals cannot be realized if they are undermined
by the promotion of innovation. U.S. innovation tax policy evolved from
general innovation policy to promote both economic progress and social welfare. 360 However, innovation tax has shifted in favor of economic progression at the expense of social safety net funding. 361 This deviation from pursuit of both twin goals of economic progress and social welfare imperils the
U.S. social safety net system.
Current analytical approaches are ill-suited to address the impending social safety net crisis. This Article introduces and applies sustainability as a

353.
354.
355.
356.
357.
358.
359.
360.
361.

See supra text accompanying notes 348–351.
See supra text accompanying notes 74–96.
See supra text accompanying notes 77–89.
See supra text accompanying note 243.
See supra text accompanying notes 111–139.
See supra text accompanying notes 140–153.
See supra text accompanying notes 140–153.
See supra text accompanying notes 165–224.
See supra text accompanying notes 225–236.
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viable approach for harmonizing U.S. employment and innovation tax policies. 362 Sustainability requires an examination of foundational, normative
questions, integrates interdisciplinary collaboration, embraces long-term solutions, and adapts to an ever-evolving technological society. 363 With so little
scholarly work about sustainable taxation, no comprehensive sustainable tax
analysis currently exists. To advance the literature in this arena, we show
that sustainability can help harmonize employment tax and innovation tax
policies to repair the fraying social safety net. 364

362. See supra text accompanying notes 272–307.
363. See supra text accompanying notes 272–307.
364. See supra text accompanying notes 308–353.

